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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Outside Ownership in the Hedge Fund Industry 
 
BY 
 
Kevin Andrew Mullally 
 
APRIL 2, 2016 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Vikas Agarwal 
 
Major Academic Unit: Finance 
 
I examine the impact of hedge fund managers selling ownership stakes in their firms to outside owners. Funds 
with outside owners do not subsequently outperform a matched sample of funds but do attract higher flows, 
suggesting that managers sell stakes to obtain strategic growth partners. The flow impact is greater for i) funds 
with lower prior flows or performance, ii) smaller funds, and iii) funds with more reputable outside owners. 
Outsiders also monitor their investments as funds with outside owners reduce their returns management. The 
reduction in return management is stronger after the 2008 financial crisis when institutions’ reputations are 
more tarnished. Combined, the results indicate that outside ownership benefits managers, outsiders, and fund 
investors. 
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Introduction 
  The majority of hedge fund firms are private companies. The firms’ founders are the 
firm’s general partners or its managing members, depending on whether the firm is structured as 
a partnership or a limited liability corporation (LLC). These founders initially own claims to 
100% of the firms’ equity, which equals the management and incentive fee revenues the funds 
generate minus the costs and expenses they incur. However, managers often sell part of their 
equity in exchange for early stage capital or to monetize their human capital. In fact, 15% of the 
hedge fund firms in my sample sell an equity claim to an outside owner.
1
 The outsiders 
purchasing these claims are often large, well-known financial institutions such as Blackstone, 
Goldman Sachs, and J.P. Morgan. The prevalence of these sales and the outsiders’ identities 
suggest that these arrangements may occur for strategic reasons. In this paper, I study the 
determinants and effects of outside ownership in hedge fund firms.  
I develop and test three hypotheses regarding outside ownership in hedge fund firms: 1) 
timing and talent-picking, 2) growth, and 3) monitoring. The first hypothesis – timing and talent-
picking – predicts that either the inside or outside owner has the ability to predict a future change 
in performance. More specifically, this hypothesis proposes that inside owners sell stakes as a 
way of exiting before their funds’ performance declines. Alternatively, outside owners may have 
talent-picking ability and purchase stakes because they can identify hedge fund firms whose 
performance will subsequently improve. Prior literature provides evidence that certain parties 
have the ability to forecast future fund performance (Ding et al. (2009), Ozik and Sadka (2015), 
Jorion and Schwarz (2015)). 
                                                          
1
 Throughout the paper I will refer to a hedge fund firm’s managers and founders as “inside owners” and the non-
founders purchasing these stakes as “outside owners.” Figure 1 contains a picture of a sample deal and the change in 
the firm’s cash flow rights.   
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The second hypothesis – growth – proposes that inside owners sell stakes to obtain a 
strategic partner who can help increase firm size. Press releases announcing purchases of equity 
stakes in hedge fund firms often cite the desire for growth as a reason for these arrangements.
2
 
Both inside and outside owners have incentive to increase the size of the business since the value 
of their claims increases with firm size.
3
 There are multiple ways an outside owner can help the 
insider grow his firm. First, outside owners may provide the capital, infrastructure, or expertise 
necessary to open new funds or expand to new strategies. Second, the outsider’s decision to 
purchase a stake in a given inside owner may certify the insider’s quality and thus help him 
attract higher flows to his fund(s). Because hedge funds are lightly regulated and not required to 
publicly report their performance, potential investors must conduct extensive due diligence to 
mitigate the high level of operational risk associated with investing in hedge funds. The fact that 
an outsider is willing to purchase a stake in a given insider signals to potential investors that the 
insider has triggered no major red flags during this process.
4
 Finally, the outsider may also 
market and distribute the insider’s funds to his own clients.5  
My third hypothesis – monitoring – predicts that outside owners monitor the insider’s 
actions once they purchase their ownership stake. News articles and press releases often note that 
managers sell stakes to obtain the outsider’s assistance with regulatory compliance and back 
                                                          
2
 For example, see the following article announcing Context Capital’s purchase of a stake in Betzwood Partners: 
http://www.finalternatives.com/node/17031. The following is a quote from Karen Batchelder, a director at Context: 
“We develop investment ideas and seed them and then go out and raise third-party capital.”  
3
 Recent studies by Liang and Schwarz (2011), Yin (2013), and Fung et al (2015) find that managers take action to 
increase assets under management even if doing so adversely impacts performance.  
4
 See studies by Brown et al (2008, 2009, 2012) on operational risk. Conversations with practitioners confirm that 
extensive due diligence is conducted before outsiders decide to purchase a stake.  
5
 The following is a quote from the press release announcing Credit Suisse’s decision to purchase a stake in York 
Capital: “Credit Suisse expects to enter into non-exclusive arrangements to provide distribution services 
for York funds.” 
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office support which suggests that outsiders will have the ability to observe the insider’s actions.6 
Further, because their reputations now partially depend on the insiders’ behavior, outsiders also 
have incentive to monitor operational risk. Specific examples of operational risk include return 
management and outright fraud (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2011); Bollen and Pool (2012); 
Dimmock and Gerken (2012, 2015)). 
I test these hypotheses using data from two main sources. The first source is Form ADV, 
a required Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing for registered investment advisors 
with at least $150 million in assets under management. Investment advisors are required to report 
in Form ADV the identities of all officers and other parties who own at least 5% of the company. 
Most importantly for my study, companies are required to disclose the date on which each party 
first acquired its ownership claim. The information provided in Schedule A allows me to 
precisely identify when changes in firm ownership structure occurred and examine their 
determinants and consequences. The second data source is a union of four commercially 
available hedge fund databases: Lipper TASS, Hedge Fund Research (HFR), EurekaHedge, and 
Morningstar. 
I begin my analysis by modeling the determinants of an outside owner purchasing an 
equity stake in a hedge fund. To do so, I estimate multinomial logistic models which allow the 
determinants of partial and full stake sales to differ. Outsiders are more likely to purchase a 
partial stake in a fund if it has high past performance but lower past flows. I interpret these 
findings as consistent with the growth hypothesis. If the insider was performing well and 
attracting flows, he would have seemingly little incentive to reduce his own equity stake. If a 
                                                          
6
 For example, see “Big Investors Buying Stakes for Hedge-Fund Fees,” Eric Uhlfelder (Barron’s), November 22, 
2014. http://www.barrons.com/articles/big-investors-buying-stakes-for-hedge-fund-fees-1416632633.  
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fund was performing poorly and also not receiving flows, that fund would likely not be an 
attractive investment for prospective outside owners.  
The results from the determinants regressions indicate that these transactions are not 
random events. For this reason, simply comparing the group of funds with an outside owner to 
the entire group of funds with outside owners is not an appropriate identification strategy. To 
control for this selection effect, I use one-to-one, nearest neighbor propensity score matching to 
construct a sample of control funds (or firms) that have not sold a stake to an outside owner but 
have similar observable characteristics to those funds that have sold a stake at a given date. The 
remainder of my analysis compares the group of funds with an outside owner to this matched 
control group.  
 I conduct a series of tests of the timing and talent-picking hypothesis by examining fund 
performance after an outside owner purchases his stake. I compare the performance of the funds 
selling a partial stake to an outside owner to the performance of the control group of funds. 
Overall, the performance of these two groups is not statistically different in the two-year period 
after the stake is sold. This result provides preliminary evidence against the timing and talent-
picking hypothesis.  
Next, I compare the relative performance of several subsamples in an attempt to provide 
support for the timing and talent-picking hypothesis. First, if an insider is selling a stake because 
he anticipates poor performance, one would expect his fund’s future performance to be 
negatively related to the size of the stake sold. However, I find no evidence that funds whose 
inside owners sell full stakes subsequently underperform their counterparts. Moreover, there is 
no statistically significant difference in the subsequent performance of the funds selling partial 
and full stakes. Second, I compare the performance of various subsets of funds and outside 
10 
 
owners more or less likely to have timing ability. I argue that older funds and outsiders with 
more experience purchasing stakes in hedge funds are more likely to have timing and talent-
picking ability, respectively. I find no evidence to support this claim. Older funds selling stakes 
do not exhibit significantly larger underperformance than do younger funds selling stakes. 
Outsiders with more experience purchasing hedge fund stakes are not able to pick funds that 
subsequently outperform. As a final test of the timing and talent-picking hypothesis, I examine 
whether outsiders with experience managing alternative investments (e.g., private equity firms or 
hedge fund firms) choose funds with better future performance. My results indicate that this 
subset of investors does possess this ability; funds purchased by outside owners with experience 
managing alternative investments have statistically higher levels for three out of four 
performance measures. Overall, my results provide only limited support for the timing and 
talent-picking hypothesis.  
I begin testing the growth hypothesis by examining insiders’ propensity to expand. My 
results indicate that hedge fund firms with an outside owner are i) more likely to open a new 
fund, ii) more likely to expand into a new strategy, and iii) open more new funds and more new 
strategies in the two-year period after they sell a stake. Next, I see if funds with outside owners 
attract higher flows. My results indicate that funds selling partial stakes experience 
approximately 6.90 – 11.22% higher annual flows compared to their matched counterparts. 
Considering that the mean fund in my sample receives annual flows of 8.40%, this effect is 
highly economically significant. Most importantly, the increase in flows is incremental to the 
effects of past and contemporaneous performance and prior fund flows.  
If managers sell equity stakes to obtain help growing their funds, I expect that the impact 
on flows should be greater for funds most in need of help attracting capital. Indeed, funds with 
11 
 
lower prior flows and lower assets under management experience statistically larger increases in 
subsequent flows than do funds with higher past flows, higher past performance, and more assets 
under management funds. I also expect that more reputable outside owners and those with asset 
management divisions (e.g., distribution services in place) will have a greater impact on fund 
flows. Indeed, funds selling stakes to outside owners with more experience buying stakes in 
hedge funds receive significantly higher flows than those funds selling to less experienced 
outsiders. Moreover, funds that sell to outsiders with asset management divisions also receive 
higher flows as compared to those selling to outsiders without asset management divisions. 
Taken together, the results on expansion and fund flows provide strong evidence in favor of the 
growth hypothesis. 
My last set of tests examines the monitoring hypothesis. First, I find that funds with 
outside owners engage in less return management than does the matched sample of funds without 
outside owners. It is important to note that these differences only arise in the periods after the 
outside owners purchase their stakes. If the outside owners are concerned with protecting their 
own reputations, I expect the reduction in return management to be particularly large when 
outsiders’ reputations are more fragile and when outsiders are more reputable. Indeed, I find that 
i) the reduction in return management is larger for deals completed after the 2008 financial crisis 
and ii) for funds associated with more reputable outsiders. Funds with outside owners are also 
significantly less likely to be charged with fraud by the SEC. The reduction in agency problems 
provides a potential explanation for why investors allocate more capital to funds with outside 
owners even though these funds do not outperform their peers.  
Taken together, my results provide the most support for the growth and monitoring 
hypotheses. The results indicate that these arrangements benefit all parties involved. The increase 
12 
 
in fund flows increases the value of the hedge fund firms’ equity which is beneficial to both the 
inside and outside owners. Fund investors also benefit as they experience a reduction in 
operational risk.  
This study makes several contributions to the extant literature. To my knowledge, my 
paper is the first to examine changes in hedge fund firms’ ownership structures and how these 
changes impact their performance, flows, and operational risk.
7
 As mentioned earlier, 15% of the 
hedge fund firms in my sample have sold a stake to an outside owner, meaning that this practice 
is relatively common. Further, a Deloitte industry outlook report suggests that the frequency of 
these sales will continue to increase as hedge fund managers (e.g., inside owners) look for ways 
to expand or institutionalize their businesses or exit their firms.
8
 For these reasons, it is important 
that academics, investors, and regulators gain a better understanding of a phenomenon that is 
impacting the hedge fund industry and appears will do so even more moving forward. 
Second, my study uncovers a new channel through which hedge fund managers raise 
capital. Researchers have traditionally focused on the relations between flows and fund 
performance and contractual characteristics (Ding et al. (2009), Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach 
(2015), Baquero and Verbeek (2015)). However, scholars have begun to investigate other ways 
managers can reduce investors’ search costs and attract higher fund flows. Lu et al. (2015) find 
that mutual fund companies also managing hedge funds are more likely to advertise when hedge 
fund flows are low. They find that these advertising expenditures lead to an increase in hedge 
fund flows despite these funds underperforming in the future. Jorion and Schwarz (2015) suggest 
that hedge funds report to multiple commercial databases as a way of lowering investors’ search 
                                                          
7
 Dimmock, Gerken, and Marietta-Westberg (2015) examine how managerial ownership is allocated in investment 
advisors but do not examine the impact of ownership structure and do not focus on outside ownership.  
8
 The report can be downloaded at http://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/financial-services/articles/2015-
alternative-investment-outlook.html#.  
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costs and find that, in some cases, doing so increases the flows they receive. My study adds to 
this literature by documenting that hedge fund managers can also attract more capital by selling 
an equity stake to a outsider.  
Finally, my paper adds to a nascent literature on the governance of hedge funds. Clifford, 
Ellis, and Gerken (2015) study hedge fund boards and provide evidence that the presence of 
outside directors governs and certifies fund managers. Their paper also suggests that directors 
with many board seats take actions to protect their own reputations. The findings in my paper 
complement and add to theirs. Specifically, I find that outside owners are associated with a 
reduction in agency problems and also argue that these effects are driven by the outsider’s desire 
to protect his reputational capital. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the data sources. Section II 
investigates the determinants of outside ownership. Section III studies the impact of outside 
ownership on fund performance. Section IV explores the growth generated from outside 
ownership. Section V examines the outside owner’s monitoring role and Section VI concludes.  
 
I. Data Sources and Variable Construction 
A. Data Sources 
 The data used in this study primarily comes from two sources. First, I modify the 
algorithm of Joenväärä, Kosowski, and Tolonen (2014) to consolidate the TASS, Hedge Fund 
Research (HFR), EurekaHedge, and Morningstar hedge fund databases (henceforth, the “union 
database”) and to classify fund strategies.9 This procedure yields a database of 31,152 funds and 
2,315,984 monthly returns from 1994-2014. Figure 2 contains a Venn diagram of the overlap of 
                                                          
9
 Joenväärä, Kosowski, and Tolonen (2014) aggregate these databases by consolidating funds if their returns are 
correlated at the 99% level. I also require funds to have assets under management within 10% of each other to be 
consolidated. 
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the four databases. Because the phenomenon of outside owners taking stakes in hedge fund 
managers began in the early 2000s, I focus my attention on the period of 2000-2014. This 
restriction leaves a sample of 29,838 funds and 2,072,856 monthly returns.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
The second source of data I use is Form ADV filings. Starting from 2011, all U.S. hedge 
fund advisers with more than $150 million in AUM are required to register with the SEC and to 
ﬁle Form ADV.10 I use the name of a fund’s management company to merge the union database 
to the database of Form ADV filings available on the Investment Adviser Public Disclosure 
(IAPD) website.
11
 I retain only those funds whose company i) files Form ADV and ii) is 
classified as a hedge fund company using the criteria of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004). This 
requirement reduces my sample of hedge funds to 9,972 funds managed by 2,311 distinct 
companies. After eliminating funds with missing data, my final sample includes 6,707 funds 
managed by 1,945 hedge fund companies.  
Schedules A and B of Form ADV contain information on investment advisors’ ownership 
structures. Direct owners are disclosed in Schedule A of Form ADV; indirect owners are listed in 
Schedule B.
12
 Companies are required to disclose the ownership stakes of all executives, 
directors, and any other parties owning at least 5% of the company in Schedule A. The schedules 
do not provide the exact percentage each party owns but instead provide codes corresponding to 
ranges of ownership (e.g., 0 – 5%, 5 – 10%, 10 – 25%, 25 – 50%, 50 – 75%, and over 75%). 
Investment companies are required to provide information regarding each owner’s role in the 
                                                          
10
 The level of assets under management funds can have before being required to file Form ADV has changed over 
time. Papers by Brown et al. (2008), Dimmock, Gerken, and Marietta-Westberg (2015), and Jiang (2015) also use 
Form ADV and provide more background and historical information about this mandatory filing.   
11
 The IAPD website address is: http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/IAPD/Content/Search/iapd_Search.aspx.  
12
 Schedule A of Form ADV requires firms to list the ownership claims of all directors and executive officers as well 
as any other parties who own 5% or more of the firm. Schedule B lists those who hold a 25% or greater interest in a 
party listed in Schedule A. Appendix B provides an example of Form ADV Schedules A and B and details the data 
collection process. 
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company and the date on which the owner first acquired his status. For each outside owner, I 
note the owner’s identity, the date he obtained his status, and the size of his stake. I classify all 
stakes above 75% as full stakes.
13
 I am able to identify 315 hedge fund firms disclosing an 
outside owner. 
There is one limitation of using Form ADV. Because a historical archive of Schedules A 
and B is not currently available, my sample does not include any stakes that were purchased and 
sold prior to my first download of the ADV filings. To mitigate this concern, I conduct Factiva 
news searches for each hedge fund and fund company in my sample to see if they have sold a 
stake. These searches identify an additional 100 companies with an outside owner. The vast 
majority of these cases are “seed” deals in which a new fund sells a claim to their profit in 
exchange for initial capital. If a fund company sells multiple equity stakes over time, I retain 
only the first instance. In total, my sample contains 243 companies and 1,138 funds that have an 
outside owner.
14
 These figures represent 15% and 17% of the total number of fund companies 
and funds in my sample, respectively.  
It is perhaps not surprising that the number of deals completed each year has increased 
with the size of the hedge fund industry. Figure 3 plots the number of stakes sold along with the 
estimated number of hedge fund firms in existence each year from 1994-2013. The correlation 
between the two series is 0.911.  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
                                                          
13
 I verify this assumption by reading news articles for each deal I identify. 
14
 I exclude the deals conducted prior to the year 2000. If I include deals prior to 2000, I have 272 deals.  
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Table 1 contains statistics related to these deals. The majority of these deals (79%) 
involve outside owners purchasing a partial equity stake.
15
 Hedge fund firms are the most 
frequent stake buyers in my sample (35.30% of deals), followed by banks (21.98%), private 
equity firms (15.02%), and other asset management firms (12.09). Various other parties such as 
pension funds, insurance companies, individual investors, and financial services firms, comprise 
the remaining 24.38% of the sample. The hedge fund firms selling stakes range in age from new 
firms (49.66% of the sample firms) to firms that have been in existence for over 10 years 
(12.07%). Similarly, 47.79% of the hedge fund firms in my sample have reported AUM of less 
than $100 million in the union database while approximately 29.78% of my sample firms have 
AUM over $2 billion.   
[insert Table 1 here] 
B. Variable Construction 
I compute and use four performance measures. Net Return is the fund’s average monthly 
net-of-fee return in the previous 24 months. Style-Adjusted Return is a fund’s net return minus 
the equally-weighted average return of funds following the same strategy, averaged over the 
previous 24 months. Sharpe Ratio is the 24-month average of a fund’s monthly excess returns 
(e.g., its return minus the risk-free rate) divided by the standard deviation of its returns over the 
same period. Lastly, I estimate Alpha by regressing the fund’s net returns on the seven factors 
described in Fung and Hsieh (2004). Specifically, I estimate the following regression to obtain 
Alpha: 
                                                          
15
 I am not able to precisely identify the size of the stakes outsiders receive when seeding a fund but assume that 
they receive partial stakes. This assumption does not impact my analysis since these funds are only included when I 
examine flows to new funds.  
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                          (1) 
where s and t indicate months, j indicates funds, R is the monthly return of fund j, and the vector 
F is the vector of monthly returns for the seven Fung & Hsieh (2004) factors. Return Volatility is 
the standard deviation of the fund’s previous 24 monthly return observations. Flow is calculated 
as: 
 
        
(                (           ))
        
 (2) 
 I also examine two measures of operational risk. The first is December Spike, which 
equals the difference in a fund’s average December returns (gross, net, or residual) minus the 
difference in its average return for the other eleven months of the year. Second, I follow 
Dimmock and Gerken (2012) to collect data on incidences of fraud by downloading and reading 
SEC litigation releases, administrative proceedings, and complaints. I define Fraud equal to 1 if 
a fund is found one of these cases and 0 otherwise. 
I also include several fund and company characteristics as control variables. Size is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the fund’s AUM. Delta and Vega are the dollar 
changes in the manager’s compensation for a 1% increase in return and return volatility, 
respectively, following the algorithm of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009). Management Fee 
(Incentive Fee) is the percentage of AUM (profits) the manager receives as compensation. 
Offshore is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the fund is domiciled outside of the U.S. and 0 
otherwise. Lockup is the number of months an investor is required to commit his capital after 
investment. High Water Mark is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the fund has a high water 
mark provision and 0 otherwise. Star Fund is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a fund’s 
company has a “star” fund in its roster. A fund is considered to be a “star” if its Alpha is in the 
18 
 
top 5% of all alphas for the previous 24-month period, following Nanda, Wang, and Zheng 
(2004). # Top Service Providers is equal to 0, 1, 2, or 3 and is the number of the fund’s service 
providers (administrator, auditor, and prime broker) are in the top five in how much hedge fund 
business they conduct.
16
 
 
C. Summary Statistics 
 Panel A of Table 2 presents summary statistics. 1,138 (243) out of 6,707 (1,945) funds 
(companies) have an outside owner. This number represents 17% (15%) of the funds 
(companies) in the sample. The summary statistics for the performance and volatility variables 
are comparable to those reported in recent hedge fund studies (e.g., Aragon and Nanda (2012), 
Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012)). I use the natural logarithm of many of my variables to mitigate 
concerns about skewness impacting my results. Specifically, I use the natural logarithms of fund 
size and fund age in my empirical analyses.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 Panel B of Table 2 contains the results of t-tests comparing funds and fund companies 
with and without outside owners at their inception dates. Funds with outside owners have lower 
incentive fees, shorter lockup periods, are more likely to be domiciled offshore, and are less 
likely to have a high water mark provision. Companies with outside owners launch with more 
funds and more AUM. These results suggest that there are significant differences between the 
two groups of fund companies as early as inception.  
 
II. Determinants of Outside Ownership 
                                                          
16
 I obtained these rankings from www.insitutionalalpha.com.   
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I begin my analysis of the determinants of outside ownership by comparing funds selling 
partial stakes to funds selling full stakes. Panel A of Table 3 contains results from t-tests that 
compare various characteristics at the time the outside owner purchases his stake.
17
 Funds selling 
partial stakes have significantly higher levels of past performance than do funds selling full 
stakes for three out of four performance variables. Managers selling partial stakes also have 
higher Delta and are also more likely to have a high water mark provision in place.  
Next, I estimate multinomial logistic models in which the dependent variable, Stake, is 
equal to 0 if the inside owner does not sell a stake at t, 1 if the insider sells a partial stake at date 
t, and 2 if the manager sells a full stake at date t. In this way, the base group is the set of funds 
without an outside owner and I can compare the determinants of a partial stake sale to those of a 
full stake sale. Specifically, I estimate the following regression: 
   (          )  
 (                                                                         
                                                      )  
(3) 
where    includes time-invariant fund characteristics such as Lockup, High Water Mark, and 
Offshore. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 3. The odd (even) columns contain the 
coefficients for funds selling partial (full) stakes.
18
  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 The results are most consistent with the growth hypothesis. Past performance is both an 
economically and statistically significant determinant of a manager selling a partial stake but is 
                                                          
17
 I also examine whether the managers selling stakes have prior work experience with the company buying the 
claim. I find that that they do in 14% of the cases. 
18
 For robustness, I have also estimated company-level regressions by calculating equally weighted averages of the 
performance and characteristics of the funds within each company. I have also estimated fund-level logit, fund-level 
conditional logit models by year, and linear probability models where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the 
manager sells a stake of any size and 0 otherwise. The results are robust to these specifications and are shown in 
Appendix C, Tables C1-C4. 
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unrelated to the likelihood a manager sells a full stake. Using the coefficient estimates in Column 
1 of Panel B as an example, a one-standard-deviation increase in Net Return increases the 
probability a manager attracts an outside owner buyer by 34.80%. This result suggests that 
outside owners are more likely purchase partial stakes in funds whose managers have recently 
performed well. Outsiders purchasing full stakes appear to be unconcerned about the manager’s 
prior performance since the sale of a full stake likely indicates that the manager will exit.
19
  
The coefficients on past fund flows are negative and statistically significant at the 5% 
level for the partial stake cases. Using column (1) of Panel B as an example, the coefficient on 
Flows is -0.0398 with a t-statistic of -2.37. Economically, this means that a one-standard-
deviation increase in fund flows decreases the probability a manager sells a partial stake by 
13.44%. This result is consistent with the growth hypothesis as it indicates that managers are 
more likely to sell a stake when they are unable to attract fund flows. Funds belonging to 
families that contain a “star” fund are also less likely to sell either full or partial stakes. I 
interpret this result as consistent with the growth hypothesis since Nanda, Wang, and Zheng 
(2004) document that mutual funds with a “star” in their fund family attract higher inflows.  
Outside owners also purchase partial equity stakes in funds whose managers have higher-
powered performance incentives. The coefficient on Delta (Vega) is positive (negative) and 
statistically significant at the 1% (5%) level in all cases. It appears that outside owners prefer to 
purchase stakes in funds whose managers have incentives that should continue to induce higher 
performance and lower risk-taking. The coefficient on Lockup Period is also negative and 
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 I verify this assumption by reading news articles and examining ADVs around the ownership change. I find that, 
of the 47 companies selling full stakes for which I have ADV data before and after the change, 34 experience a 
management change. The CEOs and CIOs of the companies selling stakes often sign employment agreements that 
require them to remain with the firm for a few years and then exit thereafter.  
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statistically significant. Shorter lockup periods further incentivize the manager since investors 
can more easily withdraw their capital should the manager deliver poor performance.  
 
 
 
III. Outside Ownership and Fund Performance 
A. Matched Sample Creation 
The results in Section II above provide strong evidence that outside ownership does not 
occur randomly. For this reason, simply comparing the group of funds with an outside owner to 
the entire group of funds without outside owners is not an appropriate identification strategy. To 
control for this selection effect, I use one-to-one nearest neighbor propensity score matching to 
construct samples of control funds (or firms) that follow the same strategy and have not sold a 
stake to an outside owner at the same date.
20
 I compare the values of the independent variables 
used in the determinants regression for the two groups of funds and find that all but two, age and 
vega, are not significantly different.
21
 
The remainder of my analysis compares the group of funds (firms) with an outside owner 
to this matched control group of funds (firms) without an outside owner. I examine the impact of 
the outside owner in the two-year period after the stake is sold. It is important to note that this 
matching process only takes into account information available at time t. For this reason, it is 
                                                          
20
 A caveat to my analysis is that propensity score matching does not control for unobservable variables. This 
limitation means that I cannot eliminate the possibility that some variable correlated with the outsider owners’ 
decisions to purchase stakes also explains the subsequent effects I observe. 
21
 The univariate comparisons of the variables in the determinants models can be found in Appendix C, Table C5. 
Although the age of the two groups is statistically different, the magnitude of the difference in the natural logarithm 
of age is only 0.10.  
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possible that a fund selling a stake to an outside owner at date t is matched to a fund that does not 
sell a stake at time t but does so at another point in the future.  
 
B. Tests of the Timing and Talent-picking Hypothesis 
I begin my analysis of the effects of these ownership changes by examining subsequent 
fund performance. If the insiders (outsiders) involved in these transactions have the ability to 
time their exit (choose subsequent outperformers), funds with outside owners should 
underperform (outperform) the matched sample of funds. I test this prediction of the timing and 
talent-picking hypothesis by estimating the following linear regression: 
                                     
                        (4) 
where the dependent variable, Perfi,t+1,t+24, is one of the four measures of fund performance used 
throughout the paper. OutsideOwneri,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the funds with 
outside owners and 0 otherwise and Xi,t contains fund-level characteristics such as fund size, 
High Water Mark, Management Fee, Incentive Fee, Offshore, and the fund’s prior performance 
and flows. I present the results of these regressions in Table 4.  
[insert Table 4 here] 
 Panel A contains the results for funds that sell partial stakes and Panel B contains the 
results for funds selling full stakes. There is no evidence that either group of funds has 
performance that is different than their peers; the coefficients on OutsideOwner are statistically 
insignificant for all specifications. If insiders are selling stakes to exit funds that will 
subsequently underperform, one would expect the underperformance to be particularly severe 
when funds sell full stakes. I find no evidence that this is the case. Moreover, there is no 
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statistically significant difference in the coefficients on Outside Owner for partial and full stake 
groups.  
 
B.1. Subsample Analyses of the Timing and Talent-Picking Hypothesis 
The results in Table 4 indicate that, on average, neither the inside nor the outside owners 
possess the ability to predict future fund performance. However, there may be subsets of insiders 
or outsiders that possess this ability. I argue that older funds, outsiders with more experience 
buying hedge fund stakes, and outsiders with experience managing alternative investments are 
more likely to possess timing or talent-picking ability.
22
 To test this idea, I estimate the 
regression in equation (4) separately for each subsample of funds and then compare the 
coefficients on Outside Owner using F-tests. 
I present the results of these tests in Table 5. Panel A contains the results when funds are 
divided based on whether they are in the top quartile of fund age; Panel B contains the results 
when funds are divided whether their outside owner is in the top quartile of experience; Panel C 
contains the results when funds are divided based on whether their outside owner has experience 
managing alternative investments. I find no evidence that either insiders’ or outsiders’ 
experience has impact on their ability to time their exit or pick superior funds, respectively. In 
seven out of eight cases, the coefficients on Outside Owner are not significantly different. The 
only case in which the coefficients on Outside Owner are significantly different for the two 
groups is in column 2 of Panel A. In this case, the subsequent performance of the older funds is 
higher than that of their younger counterparts, a result that contradicts the notion that older funds 
can predict a subsequent performance decline.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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 I use fund age as a proxy for manager experience since hedge fund managers leave their funds.  
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The results in Panel C of Table 5 indicate that funds selling stakes to outside owners with 
experiencing managing alternative investments outperform those funds whose outside owners 
lack this experience. The difference in the coefficients on Outside Owner is statistically 
significant for three out of four performance measures. For example, funds with outside owners 
that possess alternatives experience have 0.154% higher Style-Adjusted Returns per month than 
their matched counterparts. Funds that sell an equity stake to an outside owner without 
alternatives experience underperform their peers by 0.218% per month. This difference of 
0.372% is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Combined, the results in Tables 4 and 5 provide limited support for the timing and talent-
picking hypothesis. This result is consistent with studies that find limited evidence of a “smart 
money” effect in which investors have the ability to forecast future fund performance (Sapp and 
Tiwari (2004), Frazzini and Lamont (2008), Ramadorai (2013), Baquero and Verbeek (2015)). 
Taken together, the results in this section seem to suggest that outside ownership has little impact 
on fund performance.  
 
IV. Outside Ownership and Firm Growth 
A. Company Expansion 
If the desire for expansion is one of the insiders’ motives in selling stakes, fund 
companies with outside owners should be more likely to open a new fund and more likely to 
expand into new strategies after the outside owner arrives. I test this claim by estimating the 
following logistic regressions:  
   (          )   (                  
 ) (5) 
   (              )   (                  
 ) (6) 
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where NewFundi,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if company i opens a new fund in month t 
and 0 otherwise. NewStrategyi,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if company i expands to a new 
strategy in month t and 0 otherwise. OutsideOwneri,t is the main independent variable of interest 
and is equal to 1 for companies with an outside owner and 0 for the matched sample of 
companies without an outside owner. X is a vector of company-level control variables calculated 
by equally-weighting the funds the company manages.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 6 contain the results of the logistic models. The coefficient on 
OutsideOwneri,t is positive and statistically significant both when the dependent variable is 
NewFundi,t and NewStrategyi,t. The economic impact of the outside owner on companies’ 
likelihood of expansion is large. Specifically, the addition of the outside owner increases the 
likelihood of a manager opening a new fund (new strategy) by 66.6% (112%). The outside 
owner’s impact is incremental to that of company performance, flows, and other characteristics. I 
also estimate OLS regressions in which the dependent variables are the number of new funds and 
number of new strategies each company opens in the 24-month period after the outside owner 
purchases a stake. These results are presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6. The results of these 
tests indicate that companies with outside owners open approximately 0.5 (0.2) more new funds 
(new strategies) than do their matched counterparts in the subsequent 24-month period.
23
  
 
B. Ability to Attract Fund Flows 
                                                          
23
 These results are also robust to the use of probit and tobit models, respectively. The results of these tests can be 
found in Appendix C, Table C6. I also estimate conditional logit models for the probability that companies open 
new funds and new strategies. The results hold for the probability of opening a new fund but become statistically 
insignificant for the probability of opening a new strategy.  
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Another way the outside owner can assist with growth is through an increase in fund 
flows. As mentioned earlier in the paper, many press releases announcing these deals note that 
the outside owners will provide distribution services for the insider’s funds. I compare the flows 
received by funds with outside owners to those received by the control samples of funds by 
estimating the following OLS regression: 
                                       
       (7) 
where OutsideOwner is the key variable of interest. X is a vector of control variables that 
includes each fund’s past and contemporaneous performance, past flows, size, age, management 
and incentive fee, lockup period, and indicator variables equal to one if the fund is domiciled 
offshore and has a high water mark provision. I also include strategy and year fixed effects in the 
regressions. The results are presented in Table 7.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 Columns (1) and (2) contain the results when funds matched by propensity score while 
columns (3) and (4) contain the results when funds are matched only on past flows. The 
coefficient on OutsideOwner is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for all 
specifications. The magnitude of the coefficient ranges from 0.575 to 0.934, meaning that funds 
selling partial stakes to an outside owner attract 0.575 – 0.935% higher flows per month than do 
their matched counterparts in the 24 months following the stake sale. This increase is equivalent 
to 6.90 – 11.22% higher flows on an annual basis. This impact is economically significant as the 
mean (median) fund in my sample receives flows of 8.40% (3.12%) per year. All specifications 
include both past and contemporaneous fund performance, meaning that the outside owner’s 
impact on flows is incremental to that of the funds’ performance. These results suggest that 
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outside owners do help insiders attract higher flows and are consistent with the growth 
hypothesis.  
It is also possible that the outsider owner is purchasing a stake at the company-level and 
simultaneously investing at the fund-level meaning that the flow impact I am documented is not 
driven by the funds received capital from new investors. To mitigate this concern, I estimate the 
regression in equation 5 using monthly flows at the dependent variable and include dummy 
variables based on whether the given flow observation is 1-6, 7-12, or 13-24 months after the 
date the outsider purchases his stake. I also include interactions of these dummy variables with 
Outside Owner. If the documented increase in flows is driven by the outside owners also 
directing capital into the funds, I would expect the coefficient on the interaction of Outside 
Owner and the dummy for the 1-6 month period to be positive and statistically significant. I do 
not find this to be the case; the increase in flows is concentrated in the 13-24 month period after 
the stakes are sold.
24
  
 
B.1. Subsample Analyses of the Outsiders’ Impact on Fund Flows 
If insiders are selling stakes because they believe that the outside owner can help increase 
assets under management, one would expect the flow impact to be greater for funds less able to 
attract flows on their own. To test this conjecture, I divide my sample of funds into subsamples 
based on whether they are above or below the median of two variables that measure a fund’s 
prior ability to attract capital: past flows and fund size. I argue that funds with funds with lower 
prior flows and smaller funds are less able to attract flows than funds with higher past flows and 
larger funds, respectively. I estimate the regression in equation (6) separately for the two groups 
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 This result can be found in Table C7 of Appendix C. 
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of funds and test the difference of the coefficients on OutsideOwner using an F-test. Table 8 
contains the results.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Panel A contains the results when funds are divided based on past flows and Panel B 
contains the results when funds are divided by size. Three findings merit mention. First, funds 
with below median levels of the two proxy variables earn 1.57 – 1.94% higher flows per month 
than do their matched counterparts after the outside owner’s arrival. Second, funds with above 
median levels of these variables do not receive statistically higher flows than their matched 
counterparts. Finally, the coefficients on OutsideOwner is statistically different at the 5% level 
when funds are divided based on past flows while the difference is marginally significant (p-
value = .123) when funds are divided based on size.  
Finally, I examine whether certain types of outsiders have a greater impact on fund flows. 
To begin, I ask whether more reputable outside owners have a bigger impact on fund flows. To 
test this prediction, I use the outside owner’s experience purchasing hedge fund stakes as a proxy 
for reputation.
25
 I divide my sample of outside owners based on whether they are in the top 
quartile of the number of deals completed. As in my earlier analysis, I estimate the regression of 
equation (5) separately for each subsample of funds (e.g., those funds with more experienced 
outside owners and those associated with less experienced outsiders) test the equality of the 
coefficients on OutsideOwner. Panel A of Table 9 contains the results.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 Funds selling stakes to more experienced outsiders attract 1.91% higher flows per month 
than their counterparts. The coefficient on OutsideOwner for this group of funds is significant at 
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 Gompers and Lerner (2000) and Demiroglu and James (2010) use experience as a proxy for reputation in the 
venture capital setting.  
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the 1% level. Funds selling stakes to less experienced outsiders attract 0.28% higher flows per 
month than their matched counterparts but this difference is not statistically significant. The 
difference in the coefficients on OutsideOwner (1.91 – 0.28 = 1.63%) is significant at the 5% 
level.
26
  
 I also test whether outside owners with asset management divisions have a greater impact 
on fund flows. My argument is that firms with asset management divisions likely have 
distribution networks in place that will increase flows to hedge fund firms. Indeed, funds that sell 
to asset management firms experience a 0.82% higher flows per month than do their matched 
counterparts. Funds that sell stakes to outsiders without asset management divisions do not 
receive statistically higher flows than their matched counterparts.  
Combined, the results in this section provide strong evidence supporting the growth 
hypotheses. Fund companies with partial outside owners open more new funds and expand to 
more new strategies relative to companies without outside owners. Funds selling a partial stake 
to an outside owner also receive higher flows than their counterparts without outside owners. 
The flow effect is stronger for funds less able to attract capital on their own and for funds selling 
to more reputable outside owners and outside owners with better distribution networks in place.  
 
V. Outside Owners as Monitors 
The monitoring hypothesis posits that outsiders have incentives to monitor the inside 
owner and reduce actions that increase the operational risk investors face. Specifically, outside 
owners may monitor and reduce return management and outright fraud since being associated 
with a hedge fund with high levels of these behaviors may have adverse reputational effects for 
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 I also examined whether the flow impact is greater during times of high industry/strategy volatility and low 
industry/strategy performance. I found that the flow impact was greater during these times but the differences are 
not statistically significant. These results can be found in Appendix C, Table C9. 
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the outsider. Outside owners often provide back office support and help with regulatory 
compliance as part of these deals which suggests that they would have the ability to observe and 
monitor the insiders’ actions.   
 
A. Returns Management 
Next, I examine whether outside owners reduce returns management. Agarwal, Daniel, 
and Naik (2011) document that, on average, hedge funds’ gross returns are about 1% higher in 
December than they are in other months. The authors also find that managers with higher 
compensation incentives have larger December spikes and suggest that this type of return 
management is done so that these managers can charge higher fees. These findings suggest that 
return management represents a source of operational risk that adversely impacts fund investors. 
Investors who exit the fund in a month other than December are also adversely affected since 
part of the return they should be receiving is allocated to December returns. Finally, Cici, 
Kempf, and Puetz (2013) and Dimmock and Gerken (2015) find that funds with higher 
December spikes are also more likely to report equity valuations that deviate from true closing 
prices and are more likely to have other forms of return misreporting. Combined, these findings 
suggest that a reduction of return misreporting represents a form of monitoring that benefits 
hedge fund investors.   
To test whether the presence of an outside owner is associated with lower return 
management, I augment the main regression specification in Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik by 
adding four independent variables. Specifically, I estimate the following linear regression using 
observations from the two years before and after the outside owner arrives:  
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   (                )    (                      )
                 
             
(8) 
where the dependent variable, Return, is fund i’s net, gross, or Fung and Hsieh (2004) residual 
return in month m. December is an indicator equal to 1 if the return observation is for the month 
of December and 0 otherwise. After is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the observation occurs 
after the outside owner arrives and 0 otherwise. Controls is a vector of control variables that 
includes the fund’s delta, the return necessary to reach the threshold net asset value (e.g., 
Moneyness), an indicator variable (Non-December Quarter End) equal to 1 for non-December 
quarter ends and 0 otherwise, past 12-month return volatility, two lagged returns, and the other 
fund characteristics used throughout this paper. The coefficient of interest is β2; a negative and 
statistically significant indicates that the outside owner reduces return management. Β4, the 
coefficient on December × Outside Owner captures the level of return management funds with 
an outside owner engaged in prior to the outsider’s arrival. If outside owners simply pick funds 
that had lower levels of return management prior to the stake sale, one would expect β4 to be 
negative and statistically significant and β2 to be statistically insignificant.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Panel A of Table 10 contains the results. First, the coefficients on December are positively 
and highly statistically significant for each dependent variable, consistent with Agarwal, Daniel, 
and Naik (2011). The coefficient on December is 0.846 in Column 1, meaning that funds’ gross 
returns are, on average, 0.846% higher in the month of December. Most importantly, β2 is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level for all three dependent variables, meaning 
that funds with outside owners have lower December spikes after the outside owners arrive. For 
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the gross return regression, the coefficient of -0.595 on December × OutsideOwner × After 
means that the December spikes of funds with outside owners are 0.595% lower after the 
outsider takes his stake. The coefficient on December × OutsideOwner mitigates concerns that 
outside owners are simply selecting funds with lower ex-ante levels of return management as it is 
not statistically significant in any of the three regressions.  
 
A.1. Subsample Analyses on Return Management Effects 
The results in Table 10 suggest that outside ownership is associated with a reduction in return 
management. I conduct subsample analyses to provide some evidence that outside owners at 
least partially cause this reduction. To begin, I examine changes in return smoothing behavior 
based on whether the stake sale was completed before or after 2008. I argue that both funds and 
outside owners will be more conscious of their reputations after 2008 because of the financial 
crisis and the Madoff fraud incident. To test this conjecture, I estimate the regression described 
in Equation 8 separately for deals completed before and after 2008 and present the results in 
Table 11, Panel A.
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To begin, if funds were in general reducing return management after 2008, the coefficient on 
December would be statistically lower for the regression after 2008. I do not find this pattern in 
the data. Using gross returns as an example, the coefficients on December for the pre- and post- 
2008 periods are 0.782 and 0.852, respectively, and are not statistically different. If outside 
owners were more concerned about their reputations after the financial crisis, the Madoff 
scandal, and discussions about potential legislation, I expect that they would have a larger impact 
on return management after 2008. That is, the coefficient on December × OutsideOwner × After 
should be significantly more negative in the post-2008 period. I find this to be the case; in all 
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 Deals completed in 2008 are included in the before period.  
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three regressions, the coefficient on December × OutsideOwner × After in the post-2008 period 
is statistically lower than it is in the pre-2008 period.  
Next, I divide the sample of funds based on the outsider’s reputation (e.g., experience) and 
estimate the regression in Equation 8 separately for the high and low reputation outsiders. Panel 
B of Table 11 contains the results of these regressions. I expect that outsiders with better 
reputations would have a greater impact on return management. That is, I expect that the 
coefficient on December × OutsideOwner × After to be more negative for funds selling stakes to 
more reputable outsiders. I find that this is the case for all three dependent variables, though the 
difference in coefficients is only statistically significant when residual returns are used as the 
dependent variable.  
 
B. Outright Fraud 
I follow Dimmock and Gerken (2012) to collect data on incidences of fraud by downloading 
and reading SEC litigation releases, administrative proceedings, and complaints. I am able to 
identify 338 hedge funds accused of committing various types of fraud, 155 of which I can 
match to the union database. I find that funds with outside owners have a 0.32% unconditional 
probability of committing fraud while funds without outside owners have a 0.72% probability. 
This difference of 0.40% is statistically significant at the 1% level. Focusing only on the sample 
of funds with outside owners and the propensity score matched sample, the difference in 
probability is 1.36% and is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
 Combined, the results in Section V strongly suggest that the presence of an outside owner 
is associated with a reduction in operational risk. Not only do the results strongly support the 
monitoring hypothesis, they also provide a potential explanation for why investors allocate more 
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capital to funds with outside owners in spite of the fact that these funds do not outperform the 
matched sample. It is possible that investors are allocating additional capital to these funds 
because they believe that the outside owners have screened and will monitor the insiders with 
whom they associate.    
 
V. Conclusion 
 In this paper, I examine the determinants and effects of changes in hedge fund 
companies’ ownership structure. My results indicate that hedge fund managers sell equity stakes 
to acquire partners who help them grow their firms. Despite the fact that I find little evidence of 
future outperformance, fund companies that sell stakes to outside owners open more new funds, 
expand to more new strategies, and attract higher flows. These effects are particularly strong 
when a fund was previously more growth-constrained and when the outside owner is more 
reputable. Outside owners appear to take an active monitoring role in these funds to protect their 
own reputations as funds with outside owners reduce return management and are less likely to 
commit outright fraud. Taken together, my findings suggest all parties involved benefit from 
these arrangements. The increase in firm size leads to an increase in value of both the inside and 
outside owners’ equity claims. Fund investors benefit from these arrangements as they 
experience a decrease in operational risk. 
35 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Agarwal, Vikas, Naveen D. Daniel, and Narayan Y. Naik, 2009, Role of managerial incentives 
and discretion in hedge fund performance, Journal of Finance 64, 2221-2256. 
 
Agarwal, Vikas, Naveen D. Daniel, and Narayan Y. Naik, 2011, Do hedge funds manage their 
reported returns?, Review of Financial Studies 24, 3282-3320. 
 
Aragon, George O. and Vikram Nanda, 2012, Tournament behavior in hedge funds: high-water 
marks, fund liquidation, and managerial stake, Review of Financial Studies 25, 937-974.  
 
Baquero, Guillermo and Marno Verbeek, 2015, Hedge fund flows and performance streaks: how 
investors weigh information, Working paper, ESMT and Erasmus University.  
 
Bollen, Nicolas P.B. and Veronika K. Pool, 2012, Suspicious patterns in hedge fund returns and 
the risk of fraud, Review of Financial Studies 25, 2674-2702. 
 
Brown, Keith C., W.V. Harlow, and Laura T. Starks, Of tournaments and temptations: an 
analysis of managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry, Journal of Finance 51, 85-110.  
 
Brown, Stephen J., William N. Goetzmann, and James M. Park, 2001, Careers and survival: 
competition and risk in the hedge fund and CTA industry, Journal of Finance 56, 1869-1886. 
 
Brown, Stephen J., William N. Goetzmann, Bing Liang, and Christopher Schwarz, 2008, 
Mandatory disclosure and operational risk: Evidence from hedge fund registration, Journal of 
Finance 63, 2785-2815.  
 
Brown, Stephen J., William N. Goetzmann, Bing Liang, and Christopher Schwarz, 2009, 
Estimating operational risk for hedge funds: The -score, Financial Analysts Journal 65, 43-
53. 
 
Brown, Stephen J., William N. Goetzmann, Bing Liang, and Christopher Schwarz, 2012, Trust 
and delegation, Journal of Financial Economics 103, 221-234. 
 
Brunnermeier, Markus K., and Stefan Nagel, 2004, Hedge funds and the technology bubble, 
Journal of Finance 59, 2013-2040. 
 
Chevalier, Judith and Glenn Ellison, 1997, Risk taking by mutual funds as a response to 
incentives, Journal of Political Economy 105, 1167-1200.  
 
Cici, Gjergji, Alexander Kempf, and Alexander Puetz, 2013, The valuation of hedge funds’ 
equity positions, Working paper, The College of William and Mary and University of 
Cologne. 
 
36 
 
Clifford, Christopher P., Jesse A. Ellis, and William C. Gerken, 2015, Hedge fund boards and the 
market for independent directors, Working paper, University of Kentucky and North 
Carolina State University. 
 
Demiroglu, Cem and Christopher M. James, 2010, The role of private equity group reputation in 
LBO financing, Journal of Financial Economics 96, 306-330.  
 
Dimmock, Stephen G. and William C. Gerken, 2012, Predicting fraud by investment managers, 
Journal of Financial Economics 105, 153-173.  
 
Dimmock, Stephen G. and William C. Gerken, 2015, Regulatory oversight and return 
misreporting by hedge funds, Review of Finance, forthcoming. 
 
Dimmock, Stephen G., William C. Gerken, and Jennifer Marietta-Westberg, 2015, What 
determines the allocation of managerial ownership within firms?, Journal of Corporate 
Finance 30, 44-64.  
 
Ding, Bill, Mila Getmansky, Bing Liang, and Russ Wermers, 2009, Share restrictions and 
investor flows in the hedge fund industry, Working paper, University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, SUNY Albany, and University of Maryland. 
 
Frazzini, Andrea and Owen A. Lamont, 2008, Dumb money: mutual fund flows and the cross-
section of stock returns, Journal of Financial Economics 88, 299-322.  
 
Fung, William and David A. Hsieh, 2004, Hedge fund benchmarks: A risk-based approach, 
Financial Analysts Journal 60, 65-80.  
 
Fung, William, David A. Hsieh, Narayan Y. Naik, and Melvyn Teo, 2015, Growing the asset 
management franchise: evidence from hedge fund firms, Working paper, Duke University, 
London Business School, and Singapore Management University. 
 
Gompers, Paul and Josh Lerner, 2000, Money chasing deals? The impact of fund inflows on 
private equity valuations, Journal of Financial Economics 55, 281-325. 
 
Huang, Jennifer, Clemens Sialm, and Hanjiang Zhang, 2011, Risk shifting and mutual fund 
performance, Review of Financial Studies 24, 2575-2616. 
 
Jiang, Wenxi, 2015, Leveraged speculators and asset prices, Working paper, The Chinese 
University of Hong Kong.  
 
Joenväärä, Juha, Robert Kosowski, and Pekka Tolonen, 2014, The effect of investment 
constraints on hedge fund investor returns, Working paper, University of Oulu and Imperial 
College. 
 
37 
 
Jorion, Philippe and Christopher Schwarz, 2015, Who are the smartest investors in the room? 
Evidence from U.S. hedge funds solicitation, Working paper, University of California at 
Irvine.  
 
Liang, Bing and Christopher Schwarz, 2011, Is pay-for-performance effective? Evidence from 
the hedge fund industry, Working paper, University of Massachusetts-Amherst and 
University of California at Irvine. 
 
Lim, Jongha, Berk A. Sensoy, and Michael S. Weisbach, 2015, Indirect incentives for hedge 
fund managers, Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
 
Lu, Yan, Debanjan Mitra, David Musto, and Sugata Ray, 2015, Alternative marketing for 
alternative investments, Working paper, University of Florida and University of 
Pennsylvania.  
 
Nanda, Vikram, Z. Jay Wang, and Lu Zheng, 2004, Family values and the star phenomenon: 
strategies of mutual fund families, Review of Financial Studies 17, 667-698. 
 
Ozik, Gideon and Ronnie Sadka, 2015, Skin in the game versus skimming the game: governance, 
share restrictions, and insider flows, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
forthcoming.  
 
Ramadorai, Tarun, 2013, Capacity constraints, investor information, and hedge fund returns, 
Journal of Financial Economics 107, 401-416.  
 
Sapp, Travis and Ashish Tiwari, 2004, Does stock return momentum explain the “smart money” 
effect?, Journal of Finance 59, 2605-2622.  
 
Sun, Zheng, Ashley Wang, and Lu Zheng, 2012, The road less traveled: strategy distinctiveness 
and hedge fund performance, Review of Financial Studies 25, 96-143. 
 
Yin, Chengdong, 2013, The optimal size of hedge funds: conflict between investors and fund 
managers, Working paper, Purdue University 
38 
 
Figure 1 
Typical Hedge Fund Structure Before and After a Stake Sale 
 
This figure contains diagrams of the structure of Capstone Investment Advisors, LLC before and after it sold a stake 
to Dyal Capital Partners in May 2013. 
 
Before:  
 
 
 
After:  
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Figure 2 
Venn Diagram of the Union Hedge Fund Database 
 
The Union Hedge Fund Database contains a sample of 31,152 hedge funds and funds-of-funds 
by merging four commercial databases: Eureka, HFR, Morningstar, and Lipper TASS. This 
figure shows the percentage of funds covered by each database individually and by all possible 
combinations of multiple databases. 
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Figure 3 
# Deals vs. # Hedge Fund Companies 
 
This figure plots the number of deals completed each year and the number of hedge fund 
companies reporting to the TASS, HFR, EurekaHedge, and Morningstar databases from 1994-
2013. The correlation between the number of deals completed and the number of hedge fund 
companies each year is 0.911. 
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Table 1: Deal Frequency and Statistics 
 
This table contains statistics about the deals in my sample. Panel A contains the number of deals completed each 
year. Panel B contains the breakdown of the size of the stakes purchased. Panel C provides information on the 
identities of the outside owners that purchase these stakes. Panel D provides a breakdown of the ages of the hedge 
fund firms selling these stakes.   
 
Panel A. Year-by-Year Breakdown 
 
Year # Deals % of Deals 
<=1994 6 2.21% 
1995 5 1.85% 
1996 4 1.48% 
1997 2 0.74% 
1998 4 1.48% 
1999 8 2.95% 
2000 12 4.43% 
2001 10 3.69% 
2002 13 4.80% 
2003 20 7.38% 
2004 19 7.01% 
2005 22 8.12% 
2006 23 8.49% 
2007 26 9.59% 
2008 25 9.23% 
2009 13 4.80% 
2010 17 6.27% 
2011 14 5.17% 
2012 17 6.27% 
2013 11 4.06% 
 
 
 
Panel B. Size of the Stakes Purchased 
 
Stake Range # Deals % of Deals 
5-10% 15 8.28% 
10-25% 55 20.22% 
25-50% 36 13.24% 
50-75% 31 11.40% 
Over 75% 57 20.96% 
Unknown  78 28.68% 
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Panel C. Identities of Outside Owners 
 
Outsider Type # % of Deals 
Hedge Fund Firms 97 35.53% 
Comm. Banks/BHCs 60 21.98% 
Private Equity Firms 41 15.02% 
Asset Management 33 12.09% 
Other  21 7.69% 
Insurance Companies 12 4.40% 
Financial Services 9 3.30% 
  
 
Panel D. Ages of Companies Selling Stakes 
 
Company Age # % of Deals 
Age>10 Years Old 35 12.07% 
5<=Age<=10 46 15.86% 
2<=Age<=5 47 16.21% 
Age<2 144 49.66% 
 
Panel E. Reported AUM of Companies Selling Stakes  
 
Company Size # % of Deals 
Size> $2 bill. 81 29.78% 
$1 bill. - $2 bill. 18 6.62% 
$500 mil. - $1 bill. 14 5.15% 
$100 mil. - $500 mil. 28 10.29% 
Size<$100 mil. 130 47.79% 
Missing 1 0.37% 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A of this table contains the summary statistics for the variables used in my analysis. The definitions for these variables are contained in Appendix A1. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Panel B contains the results of t-tests and Wilcoxon tests comparing the means and medians of the variables 
for funds and companies with and without outside stakeholders. All company-level variables in Panel B are calculated at the company’s inception. Differences 
marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A. Summary Statistics 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. 1
st
 Pctl. 25
th
 Pctl. 75
th
 Pctl. 99
th
 Pctl. Max. N 
           
Fund-Level Variables 
   
  
  
  
 
Outside BH (0/1) 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 6707 
Net Return (% p.m.) 0.48 0.51 0.83 -6.68 -2.32 0.18 0.84 2.68 6.57 6707 
Style-Adj. Return (% p.m.) -0.07 -0.03 0.87 -9.20 -2.82 -0.36 0.26 2.36 10.16 6707 
Sharpe Ratio (Annual) 1.04 0.69 4.17 -22.81 -2.20 0.17 1.33 9.72 240.67 6707 
Alpha (% p.m.) 0.32 0.29 0.61 -2.01 -1.46 0.03 0.60 2.30 3.26 6707 
Avg. Flow (% p.m.) 0.55 0.27 3.16 -10.16 -7.43 -0.97 4.25 11.60 21.20 6707 
Return Volatility (% p.m.) 9.73 7.91 6.55 0.07 0.93 4.99 12.92 30.71 47.34 6707 
AUM ($ millions) 182.26 56.98 360.29 0.68 0.68 17.92 176.46 2021.25 3243.48 6707 
Delta ($ millions) 0.20 0.05 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.19 2.21 2.74 5923 
Vega ($ millions) 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.33 0.56 5923 
Management Fee (%) 1.457 1.50 0.53 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 6707 
Incentive Fee (%) 15.20 20.00 7.46 0.00 0.00 10.00 20.00 25.00 25.00 6707 
Lockup Period (Months) 3.96 0.00 6.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.00 25.00 25.00 6707 
High Water Mark (0/1) 0.77 1.00 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 6707 
Offshore (0/1) 0.621 1.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 6707 
    
  
  
  
 
Company-Level Variables 
   
  
  
  
 
Outside BH (0/1) 0.15 0.000 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1945 
Number of Funds 1.87 1.09 2.04 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 6.00 15.00 1945 
Company Size (in $mil) 395.77 104.95 928.17 0.68 1.20 30.85 355.58 4599.20 19007.05 1945 
Company Inception Year 2000.42 2002.00 6.12 1980.00 1983.00 1997.00 2005.00 2011.00 2012.00 1945 
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Panel B. Univariate Tests 
 
Outside BH = 1 Outside BH = 0 Differences 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Fund-Level Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Management Fee (%) 1.47% 1.50% 1.45% 1.5% 0.02% 0.00% 
Incentive Fee (%) 13.00% 20.00% 15.65% 20.00% -2.65%*** 0.00%*** 
Lockup Period (Months) 2.85 0.00 4.18 0.00 -1.33*** 0.00%*** 
High Water Mark 0.644 1.000 0.794 1.000 -0.15*** 0.00%*** 
Leverage (0/1) 0.549 1.000 0.588 1.000 -0.039** 0.00%*** 
Offshore (0/1) 0.773 1.000 0.590 1.000 0.183*** 0.00%*** 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Company-Level Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of Funds 1.86 1.00 1.52 1.00 0.34*** 0.00*** 
Company Size (in $mil) 62.97 17.76 26.60 6.44 36.37*** 11.32*** 
Company Inception Year 1999.34 2000 2000.54 2002 -1.20*** -2.00*** 
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Table 3: Determinants of Outside Ownership 
 
This table contains results on the determinants of outside ownership. Panel A contains t-tests and Wilcoxon tests of 
the differences in means and medians of key variables for funds selling full versus partial stakes. Panel B contains 
the results of fund-level multinomial logistic regressions used to predict the sale of either a partial stake or full stake 
to an outside owner. The base outcome in Panel B is that the hedge fund does not sell a stake. The outcome variable 
equals one if the hedge fund sells a partial stake. The outcome variable equals two if the hedge fund sells a full stake 
to an outside owner. The outcome occurs at time t and all independent variables are from the two-year period prior 
to time t. The odd-numbered models predict the outcome of a partial stake sale. The even-numbered models predict 
the outcome of a full stake sale. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. All regressions 
include year and strategy dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the fund-level and adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and z-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, 
**, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A. Univariate Comparisons 
 
Partial Full Difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Net Return (% p.m.) 0.78% 0.70% 0.58% 0.51% 0.20%** 0.19%*** 
Sharpe Ratio 1.05 0.96 0.76 0.76 0.30** 0.20* 
Style-Adj. Return (% p.m.) 0.18% 0.18% 0.13% 0.04% 0.05% 0.12%** 
Alpha (% p.m.) 0.48% 0.39% 0.29% 0.16% 0.19%** 0.23%*** 
Flows (% p.m.) 1.03% 0.05% 0.97% -0.02% 0.05% 0.06% 
Size 4.60 4.74 4.62 4.74 -0.01 0.00 
Star Fund (0/1) 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Delta ($millions) 0.41 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.15** 0.02 
Vega ($millions) 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Lockup Period (months) 2.90 0.00 2.92 0.00 -0.03 0.00 
High Water Mark (0/1) 0.78 1.00 0.66 1.00 0.12*** 0.00*** 
Return Volatility (% p.m.) 2.71% 2.08% 2.23% 1.54% 0.48%** 0.54%*** 
Age (years) 6.83 6.33 7.01 5.92 -0.19 0.41 
Offshore (0/1) 0.72 1.00 0.78 1.00 -0.06 0.00 
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Panel B. Multinomial Logistic Regressions – Fund-Level 
 Outcome: Odd columns=partial stake, Even columns=full stake 
  Performance = Net Return Performance = Sharpe Ratio Performance = Style-adj. Return Performance = Alpha 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
                              0.322*** 0.099 0.190*** -0.032 0.260*** 0.115 0.392*** 0.286 
 
(4.81) (0.57) (3.43) (-0.31) (3.76) (0.58) (4.72) (1.56) 
                -0.040** -0.021 -0.040** -0.018 -0.037** -0.021 -0.040** -0.024 
 
(-2.36) (-0.82) (-2.41) (-0.69) (-2.24) (-0.82) (-2.42) (-0.96) 
          0.086* 0.225*** 0.084 0.229*** 0.087* 0.224*** 0.085 0.219*** 
 
(1.65) (3.30) (1.61) (3.40) (1.67) (3.32) (1.62) (3.21) 
Star Fund (0/1) -0.962*** -1.213** -0.854*** -1.158** -0.928*** -1.221** -1.105*** -1.360*** 
 
(-4.53) (-2.46) (-4.14) (-2.31) (-4.26) (-2.50) (-4.93) (-2.74) 
           0.248*** -0.130 0.255*** -0.105 0.265*** -0.129 0.248*** -0.148 
 
(2.94) (-0.48) (2.99) (-0.39) (3.21) (-0.47) (2.93) (-0.54) 
          -1.397** 1.023 -1.340** 0.961 -1.427*** 1.030 -1.374** 1.051 
 
(-2.52) (0.93) (-2.44) (0.88) (-2.59) (0.94) (-2.49) (0.95) 
Lockup Period (months) -0.030*** -0.001 -0.031*** -0.000 -0.030*** -0.001 -0.030*** -0.002 
 
(-2.73) (-0.06) (-2.74) (-0.01) (-2.70) (-0.06) (-2.68) (-0.10) 
High Water Mark (0/1) -0.107 -0.444* -0.111 -0.443* -0.108 -0.445* -0.116 -0.451* 
 
(-0.69) (-1.86) (-0.72) (-1.86) (-0.70) (-1.87) (-0.75) (-1.88) 
                           -0.017 -0.007 0.003 -0.008 -0.016 -0.008 -0.012 -0.005 
 
(-1.43) (-0.31) (0.26) (-0.28) (-1.32) (-0.33) (-1.07) (-0.21) 
         -0.324*** -0.602*** -0.327*** -0.612*** -0.330*** -0.601*** -0.316*** -0.589*** 
 
(-3.14) (-3.16) (-3.16) (-3.20) (-3.17) (-3.15) (-3.06) (-3.08) 
Offshore (0/1) 0.451*** 0.619** 0.447*** 0.602** 0.441*** 0.621** 0.448*** 0.632** 
 
(3.00) (2.34) (2.97) (2.29) (2.92) (2.35) (2.97) (2.39) 
# Top Service Providers 0.049 0.283** 0.056 0.280** 0.048 0.282** 0.047 0.287** 
 (0.69) (2.15) (0.80) (2.12) (0.69) (2.15) (0.67) (2.18) 
         
Strategy Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 297,047 297,047 297,047 297,047 
Pseudo R
2
 0.081 0.080 0.080 0.082 
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Table 4: Timing and Talent-picking 
Outside Ownership and Fund Performance 
 
This table contains results of multivariate regressions estimating the relation between outside ownership and hedge 
fund performance. The sample consists of funds selling a stake to an outside owner and the propensity score 
matched sample of funds. Panel A contains the results for the sample of existing funds selling partial stakes. Panel B 
contains the results for the sample of existing funds selling full stakes. The dependent variable in each case is a 
measure of performance, computed for the 24-month period after the arrival of an outside owner. The variable of 
interest is Outside Owner, which is an indicator variable equal to 1 for funds with an outside owner and 0 otherwise. 
The independent variable of interest is Outside Owner, which is an indicator variable equal to 1 for funds with an 
outside owner and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are past and contemporaneous net returns, past flows, 
lagged fund size, age, and time-invariant fund characteristics (Management Fee, Incentive Fee, Lockup Period, and 
indicator variables for offshore domicile and the presence of a high water mark provision). Standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. All regressions 
contain strategy and year fixed effects. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A. Performance of Funds Selling Partial Stakes 
  Net Return Sharpe Ratio Sty-Adj. Return Alpha 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Outside Owner (0/1) -0.019 -0.045 -0.004 -0.039 
 
(-0.30) (-0.81) (-0.05) (-0.57) 
                     0.155*** 0.178*** 0.106** 0.213*** 
 
(3.02) (3.68) (2.31) (4.42) 
                -0.020*** -0.015** 0.016 0.000 
 
(-2.68) (-2.19) (1.45) (0.06) 
          -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 0.004 
 
(-0.32) (-0.12) (-0.03) (0.19) 
         -0.072 -0.031 -0.086 -0.031 
 
(-1.14) (-0.57) (-1.01) (-0.46) 
Management Fee (%) -0.012 0.081 -0.245*** 0.083 
 
(-0.16) (1.14) (-2.63) (1.31) 
Incentive Fee (%) -0.002 0.004 0.007 0.002 
 
(-0.34) (0.73) (0.77) (0.29) 
Lockup Period (months) 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.013** 
 
(0.50) (0.69) (1.09) (2.12) 
Offshore (0/1) -0.105 -0.070 -0.042 0.050 
 
(-1.51) (-1.09) (-0.42) (0.65) 
High Water Mark (0/1) 0.091 0.078 -0.089 -0.000 
 
(1.10) (1.06) (-0.79) (-0.00) 
  
  
 
Strategy FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 474 474 474 440 
R
2
 0.324 0.139 0.380 0.253 
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Panel B. Performance of Funds Selling Full Stakes  
  Net Return Sharpe Ratio Sty-Adj. Return Alpha 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Outside Owner (0/1) -0.078 -0.047 -0.134 0.007 
 
(-0.95) (-0.57) (-0.85) (0.06) 
                     -0.033 -0.030 0.059 0.042 
 
(-1.02) (-0.96) (0.82) (1.06) 
                -0.118 0.047 -0.019 0.049 
 
(-1.48) (0.56) (-0.12) (0.45) 
          -0.082 0.060 0.239 0.257** 
 
(-1.00) (0.71) (1.47) (2.13) 
         0.001 0.013 -0.012 -0.020* 
 
(0.15) (1.38) (-0.70) (-1.67) 
Management Fee (%) 0.005 0.008 0.030* 0.016 
 
(0.65) (0.97) (1.93) (1.43) 
Incentive Fee (%) 0.035 0.001 -0.266 -0.029 
 
(0.30) (0.01) (-1.18) (-0.18) 
Lockup Period (months) -0.042 -0.046 0.186 0.118 
 
(-0.43) (-0.41) (0.89) (0.82) 
Offshore (0/1) 0.146* 0.045 0.191* -0.010 
 
(1.76) (0.66) (1.74) (-0.08) 
High Water Mark (0/1) -0.021* -0.003 -0.037* -0.018 
 
(-1.80) (-0.24) (-1.94) (-1.27) 
  
  
 
Strategy FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 156 156 155 151 
R
2
 0.410 0.407 0.552 0.304 
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Table 5: Timing and Talent-picking 
Performance of Subsamples of Funds 
This table contains results of multivariate regressions that examine the impact of outside ownership on fund 
performance for various subsamples. Funds are then divided into subsamples based on a given characteristic. Panel 
A divides funds based on fund age. Panel B divides funds based on the experience of the outside owner that buys a 
stake. Panel C divides funds based on whether the outside owner has experience managing alternatives experience. 
The dependent variable in each case is Flows, computed for the 24-month period after the outside owner’s arrival. I 
report the coefficients on Outside Owner, an indicator variable equal to 1 for funds with an outside owner and 0 
otherwise, for each subsample of funds. The control variables are as defined in Table 4. All regressions contain 
strategy and year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported below 
the coefficients in parentheses. The final two rows contain the difference in the coefficients on Outside Owner for in 
columns 1 and 2 and the p-value for the F-test of the difference. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
Panel A. Fund Age 
  Avg. Return Sharpe Ratio Style-Adj. Return Alpha 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Non-Top Quartile Age -0.014 -0.133 -0.031 -0.001 
 
(-0.19) (-1.25) (-0.46) (-0.02) 
Top Quartile Age -0.096 0.438** -0.141 -0.232 
 
(-0.67) (2.18) (-1.12) (-1.34) 
     
Difference (Below - Above) 0.082 -0.571** 0.11 0.231 
p-value (diff.) 0.613 0.0120 0.443 0.222 
 
Panel B. Outside Owner Experience 
  Avg. Return Sharpe Ratio Style-Adj. Return Alpha 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Non-Top Quartile Experience -0.009 0.065 -0.036 0.008 
 
(-0.11) (0.59) (-0.51) (0.09) 
Top Quartile Experience -0.041 -0.038 -0.112 -0.122 
 
(-0.39) (-0.25) (-1.19) (-1.06) 
     
Difference (Below - Above) 0.032 0.103 0.076 0.130 
p-value (diff.) 0.806 0.580 0.519 0.365 
 
Panel C. Outside Owners’ Experience Managing Alternatives 
  Avg. Return Sharpe Ratio Style-Adj. Return Alpha 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Alternatives Experience 0.107 0.154 0.154** 0.022 
 
(1.25) (1.28) (2.16) (0.25) 
No Alternatives Experience -0.121 -0.149 -0.218*** -0.074 
 
(-1.47) (-1.09) (-2.61) (-0.74) 
     
Difference (Below - Above) 0.228* 0.303* 0.372*** 0.096 
p-value (diff.) 0.053 0.095 0.001 0.461 
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 Table 6: Growth 
 Impact of Outside Ownership on Expansion 
This table contains results of regressions examining the impact of outside ownership on firms’ ability to expand. The 
sample consists of fund companies with an outside owner and the propensity score matched sample of companies 
without an outside owner. The dependent variable in column 1 (2) is New Fund (New Strategy), an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if a firm opens a new fund (new strategies) in a given month. The dependent variable in column 3 (4) is # 
New Funds (# New Strategies), which is equal to the number of new funds (new strategies) the fund company opens 
in the 24-months after the outside owner purchases his stake. The control variables are defined as in Table 4. All 
regressions contain strategy and year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered 
at the fund company level and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked 
with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A. Companies’ Decisions to Open New Funds 
 Logistic Regressions OLS Regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
New Fund New Strategy # New Funds # New Strategies 
  
    
Outside Owner (0/1) 0.588** 0.772* 0.497* 0.180** 
 
(2.32) (1.90) (1.76) (2.09) 
                     -0.040 -0.254 -0.016 -0.032 
 
(-0.20) (-1.08) (-0.07) (-0.46) 
                0.048 0.042 0.057 0.004 
 
(1.51) (1.06) (1.65) (0.44) 
          0.315*** 0.356*** 0.222** 0.076* 
 
(4.21) (3.20) (2.33) (1.79) 
         0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.39) (-0.84) (0.28) (-1.48) 
Management Fee (%) 0.608* 0.384 0.782* 0.241 
 
(1.65) (0.71) (1.97) (1.56) 
Incentive Fee (%) 0.000 0.131** -0.010 0.011** 
 (0.01) (2.38) (-0.42) (2.06) 
Lockup Period (months) -0.014 0.020 -0.026 -0.009 
 
(-0.69) (0.44) (-1.16) (-0.78) 
Offshore (0/1) 0.776** -0.033 0.601* -0.009 
 
(2.18) (-0.05) (1.88) (-0.11) 
High Water Mark (0/1) -1.254* -0.398 -0.103 0.103 
 (-1.86) (-0.63) (-0.22) (0.64) 
     
Year Dummies/Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,634 3,997 184 184 
Pseudo R
2
/ R
2 0.128 0.100 0.189 0.188 
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Table 7: Growth 
Outside Ownership and Fund Flows 
 
This table contains results of multivariate regressions that examine the impact of outside ownership on hedge fund 
flows. Panel A contains the results for existing funds that sell partial ownership claims to outside owners. The 
dependent variable in each case is Flow, computed for the 24 months after the outside owner’s arrival. The 
independent variable of interest is Outside Owner, which is an indicator variable equal to 1 for funds with an outside 
owner and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are past and contemporaneous net returns, past flows, lagged fund 
size, age, and time-invariant fund characteristics (Management Fee, Incentive Fee, Lockup Period, and indicator 
variables for offshore domicile and the presence of a high water mark provision) as defined in Table 4. All 
regressions contain strategy and year fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and t-statistics 
are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
  Propensity Score Matched Past Flow Matched 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
    
Outside Owner (0/1) 0.603** 0.575** 0.924*** 0.911*** 
 
(2.19) (2.06) (2.83) (2.78) 
                     0.687*** 0.650*** 0.638*** 0.668*** 
 
(3.06) (2.83) (2.72) (2.78) 
                     0.776*** 0.749*** 0.001 0.001 
 (3.69) (3.53) (0.36) (0.55) 
                0.019 -0.002 0.311*** 0.316*** 
 
(0.48) (-0.04) (7.69) (7.48) 
          -0.449*** -0.402*** -0.349*** -0.406*** 
 
(-5.27) (-4.45) (-3.55) (-3.83) 
          -0.442  0.258 
 
 (-1.55)  (0.77) 
Management Fee (%) 
 
-0.149 
 
0.237 
 
 
(-0.46) 
 
(0.65) 
Incentive Fee (%) 
 
-0.024 
 
0.016 
 
 
(-0.88) 
 
(0.51) 
Lockup Period (months) 
 
0.005 
 
-0.048 
 
 
(0.20) 
 
(-1.52) 
Offshore (0/1) 
 
-0.017 
 
0.312 
 
 
(-0.05) 
 
(0.78) 
High Water Mark (0/1) 
 
0.198 
 
-0.156 
 
 
(0.55) 
 
(-0.35) 
     
Strategy FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 447 447 456 456 
R
2
 0.249 0.256 0.309 0.320 
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Table 8: Growth 
Subsamples of Funds 
This table contains results of multivariate regressions that examine how the flow impact of the outside owner varies 
with funds’ growth constraints. The sample consists of funds with an outside owner and the propensity score 
matched sample of funds. The funds are then divided into subsamples based on whether they are above or below the 
sample median of a given characteristic. Panel A contains the regressions in which funds are divided based on past 
flows. Panel B contains the regressions in which funds are divided based on past performance. Panel C contains the 
regressions in which funds are divided based on size. The dependent variable in each case is Flows, computed for 
the 24-month period after the outside owner’s arrival. The independent variable of interest is Outside Owner, which 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 for funds with an outside owner and 0 otherwise. The control variables are defined 
as in Table 4. All regressions contain strategy and year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. The final two rows contain the 
difference in the coefficients on Outside Owner for in columns 1 and 2 and the p-value for the F-test of the 
difference. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
Panel A. Funds Divided by Flows 
  (1) (2) 
 
Above Median Flows Below Median Flows 
      
Outside Owner (0/1) -0.041 1.942*** 
 
(-0.07) (2.84) 
                     0.673 -0.138 
 
(1.48) (-0.31) 
                     0.808** 0.702 
 (2.04) (1.31) 
                0.034 0.057 
 
(0.56) (0.26) 
          -0.559*** -0.826*** 
 
(-3.15) (-3.75) 
         0.002 0.003 
 
(0.26) (0.35) 
Management Fee (%) -0.435 0.007 
 
(-0.71) (0.01) 
Incentive Fee (%) 0.009 -0.092 
 
(0.16) (-1.59) 
Lockup Period (months) -0.062 -0.037 
 
(-1.20) (-0.71) 
Offshore (0/1) -0.579 0.505 
 
(-0.83) (0.61) 
High Water Mark (0/1) -0.633 0.096 
 
(-0.85) (0.11) 
  
  
Strategy FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
   
Difference (Above − Below) -1.983** 
p-value (Diff.) 0.025 
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Panel B. Funds Divided by Size 
  (1) (2) 
 
Above Median Size Below Median Size 
      
Outside Owner (0/1) 0.221 1.572** 
 
(0.38) (2.39) 
                     0.107 0.416 
 
(0.24) (1.01) 
                     0.495 -0.161 
 (1.08) (-0.41) 
                0.003 -0.135** 
 
(0.03) (-2.54) 
          -0.199 -0.762*** 
 
(-0.66) (-3.13) 
         0.002 -0.007 
 
(0.38) (-0.88) 
Management Fee (%) -0.199 -0.732 
 
(-0.36) (-1.06) 
Incentive Fee (%) 0.047 -0.057 
 
(0.82) (-1.00) 
Lockup Period (months) -0.091* -0.095* 
 
(-1.77) (-1.74) 
Offshore (0/1) -0.182 0.235 
 
(-0.25) (0.33) 
High Water Mark (0/1) -0.289 1.048 
 
(-0.39) (1.23) 
  
  
Strategy FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
   
Difference (Above − Below) -1.351 
p-value (Diff.) 0.123 
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Table 9: Growth 
Subsamples of Outside Owners 
 
This table contains results of multivariate regressions that examine how the various characteristics of the outside 
owners impact fund flows. The sample consists of funds with an outside owner and the propensity score matched 
sample of funds. In Panel A, funds are divided based on whether the outside owner purchasing the stake is in the top 
quartile of experience buying hedge fund stakes. In Panel B, funds are divided based on whether the outside owner 
also has an asset management division. The dependent variable in each column is Flows, computed for the 24-
months after the outside owner’s arrival. The independent variable of interest is Outside Owner, which is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 for funds with an outside owner and 0 otherwise. The control variables are the same as 
those in Table 4. All regressions contain strategy and year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. The final two rows contain the 
difference in the coefficients on Outside Owner for in columns 1 and 2 and the p-value for the F-test of the 
difference. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A. Outside owner Experience 
  (1) (2) 
 
Top Quartile Experience Non-Top Quartile Experience 
      
Outside Owner (0/1) 1.908*** 0.278 
 
(2.99) (0.61) 
  
  
Other Controls YES YES 
Strategy FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
   
Difference (Top – Non-Top) 1.63** 
p-value (Diff.) 0.037 
 
Panel B. Outside Owner w/Asset Management Division 
  (1) (2) 
 
Asset Management No Asset Management  
      
Outside Owner (0/1) 0.820** 0.215 
 
(2.20) (0.47) 
  
  
Other Controls YES YES 
Strategy FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
   
Difference (Top – Non-Top) 0.605 
p-value (Diff.) 0.304 
 
55 
 
Table 10: Monitoring 
Outside Ownership and Returns Management 
This table contains results of multivariate regressions estimating the relation between outside ownership and returns 
management. The dependent variable in each model is Return, which is equal to the fund’s monthly gross return, net 
return, or residual from the Fung & Hsieh (2004) 7-factor model. The variable of interest is December × Outside 
Owner × After, where December is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the return observation is from December and 0 
otherwise, Outside Owner is an indicator variable equal to 1 for funds with an outside owner and 0 otherwise, and 
After is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the year after the outside owner arrives and 0 otherwise. The control 
variables are the same as those in Table 3 of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2011). Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the fund level and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
All regressions contain strategy and year fixed effects. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
  Y = Gross Return Y = Net Return Y=Residual 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  
  
 
December 0.846*** 0.898*** 0.470*** 
 
(6.64) (6.12) (4.83) 
December × Outside Owner × After -0.595** -0.572** -0.382** 
 
(-2.23) (-2.05) (-1.97) 
December × Outside Owner -0.248 -0.242 -0.162 
 (-1.40) (-1.25) (-1.27) 
December × After 0.145 0.108 0.030 
 
(0.79) (0.55) (0.23) 
Outside Owner (0/1) -0.047 -0.035 -0.063* 
 
(-1.21) (-0.91) (-1.70) 
Non-December Quarter End (0/1) -0.180*** -0.203*** -0.106*** 
 
(-4.84) (-5.08) (-3.27) 
             0.916*** 1.355*** 0.059 
 
(3.02) (4.20) (0.27) 
         0.032 0.013 -0.019 
 
(0.95) (0.37) (-0.70) 
       0.005** 0.004* 0.013*** 
 
(2.43) (1.92) (9.58) 
                    0.035*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 
 
(5.44) (3.36) (3.61) 
     0.191*** 0.232*** 0.053*** 
 
(16.35) (13.11) (4.85) 
     0.077*** 0.084*** 0.024* 
 
(6.77) (6.13) (1.89) 
   
 
Other Controls YES YES YES 
Style FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 28,472 28,510 28,510 
R
2
 0.064 0.078 0.024 
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Table 11: Monitoring 
Subsample Analyses of Returns Management Effects 
This table contains results of multivariate regressions estimating the relation between outside ownership and returns 
management. The dependent variable in each model is Return, which is equal to the fund’s monthly gross return, net 
return, or residual from the Fung & Hsieh (2004) 7-factor model. The variable of interest is December × Outside 
Owner × After, where December is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the return observation is from December and 0 
otherwise, Outside Owner is an indicator variable equal to 1 for funds with an outside owner and 0 otherwise, and 
After is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the year after the outside owner arrives and 0 otherwise. The control 
variables are the same as those in Table 3 of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2011). Panel A contains the results when 
the sample is divided based on whether the ownership change occurs before or after 2008. Panel B contains the 
results when the sample is divided based on outsider reputation. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at the fund level and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. All regressions 
contain strategy and year fixed effects. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively 
 
Panel A. Returns Management Before vs. After 2008 
  Gross Return Net Return Residual 
        
December (After 2008) 0.852*** 0.962*** 0.062 
 
(3.82) (3.72) (0.39) 
December (Before 2008) 0.782*** 0.785*** 0.795*** 
 
(5.56) (4.78) (6.98) 
December x Outside Owner x After (After 2008)  -1.439*** -1.341*** -1.183*** 
 
(-3.28) (-2.96) (-3.15) 
December x Outside Owner x After (Before 2008) -0.104 -0.135 0.043 
 
(-0.34) (-0.41) (0.21) 
December x Outside Owner (After 2008) 0.578* 0.561 0.213 
 
(1.80) (1.61) (1.01) 
December x Outside Owner (Before 2008) -0.224 -0.272 -0.140 
 
(-1.15) (-1.37) (-0.89) 
    December (After – Before 2008) 0.070 0.177 -0.733** 
December × Outside Owner × After (After – Before 2008) -1.335** -1.206** -1.226*** 
December × Outside Owner (After – Before 2008) 0.802** 0.833** 0.353 
    Other Controls YES YES YES 
Strategy FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
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Panel B. Outsider Reputation and Returns Management 
  Gross Return Net Return Residual 
        
December (High Reputation) 0.912*** 0.833*** 0.542*** 
 
(5.00) (4.84) (3.85) 
December (Low Reputation) 0.849*** 0.772*** 0.505*** 
 
(5.30) (5.05) (4.37) 
December x Outside Owner x After (High Rep.) -0.639 -0.576 -0.842** 
 
(-1.49) (-1.44) (-2.42) 
December x Outside Owner x After (Low Rep.) -0.502 -0.517 -0.058 
 
(-1.53) (-1.63) (-0.28) 
December x Outside Owner (High Rep.) -0.198 -0.172 -0.098 
 
(-0.66) (-0.63) (-0.48) 
December x Outside Owner (Low Rep.) 0.312 0.320 0.035 
 
(1.44) (1.55) (0.22) 
    December (High – Low Reputation) 0.063 0.061 0.037 
December × Outside Owner × After (High – Low Reputation) -0.137 -0.059 -0.784* 
December × Outside Owner (High – Low Reputation) -0.510 -0.492 -0.133 
    Other Controls YES YES YES 
Strategy FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
 
58 
 
Appendix A: 
Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Description 
Performance Variables 
 
Net Return Average net-of-fee return for the previous 24 months 
Style-Adjusted Return 
24-month average of the monthly return of fund i minus the mean return of all funds in 
its style.  
Alpha  
Alpha measure calculated using equation (1). The model used is the Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) 7-factor model 
Sharpe Ratio  
24-month average of a fund’s monthly excess returns (e.g., its return minus the risk-
free rate) divided by the standard deviation of its returns over the same period. 
Flow Calculated as   
Star Fund 
Indicator equal to 1 if a fund’s family contains a fund that is in the top 5th percentile of 
Alpha for the previous 24-month period 
  
Risk-Taking Variables 
 
Return Volatility Standard deviation of the past 24 months’ net-of-fee returns 
Idiosyncratic Volatility  Standard deviation of the residuals from the regression estimated from equation (1) 
Systematic Volatility Square root of the difference between a fund’s total and idiosyncratic return variances.  
Tail Risk Exposure 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the fund’s returns are negatively and statistically 
significantly explained by the put option factor of Agarwal and Naik (2004) and 0 
otherwise. 
  
Company/Fund Characteristics 
Size 
Natural logarithm of 1 + assets under management if assets under management are 
disclosed  
Age Calculated as the number of months from the fund/company’s inception date 
Offshore Indicator variable equal to 1 if the fund is domiciled offshore; 0 otherwise 
Lockup Period 
The number of months from the time of initial investment before an investor can 
withdraw his capital. 
High Water Mark Indicator variable equal to 1 if the fund has a high water mark provision; 0 otherwise 
Management Fee The percentage of the assets under management the manager receives as compensation 
Incentive Fee The percentage of the fund’s profits the manager receives as compensation 
Delta The expected dollar change in the manager’s compensation for a 1% change in NAV. 
Vega 
The expected dollar change in the manager’s compensation for a 1% change in 
standard deviation 
 
  1 11t t t tAUM AUM r AUM   
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Appendix B 
Data Collection Process: Form ADV Example 
 
This table contains a sample from Form ADV detailing explaining my data construction process. Panel A contains an example of Schedule A and Panel B 
contains an example of Schedule B. Both examples are taken from the Form ADV filed by Capstone Investment Advisors on February 27, 2015. 
 
Panel A. Schedule A 
 
 
I use the Perl programming language to extract the rows of each Schedule A and then manually examine each table to find parties in Schedule A with the DE and 
FE designations. In this example, we can see that a group called “Dyal Capital Partners” has a 10-25% stake in Capstone. 
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Panel B. Schedule B 
 
 
I also use the Perl programming language to extract the rows of Schedule B. Schedule B identifies who is behind the non-individual entities in Schedule A. Many 
times the general partners of these investment advisors have set up limited liability corporations (LLCs) or other vehicles to ensure that they are not personally 
liable for any losses the company sustains. I examine Schedule B to confirm that the entity listed in Schedule A (in this case, Dyal Capital Partners) is not simply 
a collection of the firm’s executives. In this example, after tracing the ownership of Dyal Capital Partners, I can see that this is ultimately a private equity fund 
that is owned and managed by Neuberger Berman. Internet searches also confirm that Dyal is indeed a fund managed by Neuberger Berman.
61 
 
Appendix C – “Outside Ownership in the Hedge Fund Industry” – Additional Tables 
 
Table of Contents 
I. Additional Determinants Tests 
a. Fund-level multinomial logistic models using gross-of-fee performance measures 
(Table C1) 
b. Fund-level logistic models – Partial and Full Stakes are Combined (Table C2) 
c. Conditional-logistic models by Year (Table C3) 
d. Linear Probability Models (Table C4) 
e. Company-level Multinomial Logistic Models (Table C5) 
 
II. Verification of propensity score match quality (Table C6) 
 
III. Additional Performance Tests 
a. Tables 4-5 without size as a control (Table C7) 
b. Tables 4-5 using gross-of-fee returns (Table C8) 
 
IV. Additional Flow Tests 
a. Probit/Tobit models for probability of adding fund/strategy (Table C9) 
b. Base flow result using other propensity score matches (Table C10) 
c. Flows to newly-opened funds (Table C11) 
d. Month-by-month flows with event-month dummies (Table C12) 
e. Additional subsample/subperiod tests (Table C13) 
 
V. Additional Agency Tests
a. Analysis of December spike without restricting to -2, +2 window (Table C14) 
b. Additional December spike subsamples (Table C15) 
c. Analysis of outsiders’ impact on risk shifting (Table C16)
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Table C1 
Fund-level Multinomial Logistic Models w/Different Specifications 
 
This table contains results of fund-level multinomial logistic regressions used to predict the sale of either a partial stake or full stake to an outside owner. The 
base outcome is that the hedge fund does not sell a stake. The outcome variable equals one if the hedge fund sells a partial stake. The outcome variable equals 
two if the hedge fund sells a full stake to an outside owner. The outcome occurs at time t and all independent variables are from the two-year period prior to time 
t. The odd-numbered models predict the outcome of a partial stake sale. The even-numbered models predict the outcome of a full stake sale. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Panel A contains models estimated using gross-of-fee returns. Panel B contains models excluding Star Fund. 
Panel C contains models that use squared performance terms rather than Star Fund. Panel D contains models excluding performance measures. All regressions 
include year and strategy dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the fund-level and adjusted for heteroskedasticity and z-statistics are reported below the 
coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Panel A. Gross-of-fee Returns 
 Outcome: Odd columns=partial stake, Even columns=full stake 
  Performance = Return Performance = Sharpe  Performance = Sty-adj. Return Performance = Alpha 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
        
                      0.262*** 0.040 0.120** -0.058 0.220*** 0.048 0.330*** 0.173 
 
(4.14) (0.22) (2.34) (-0.53) (3.38) (0.23) (4.29) (0.92) 
                -0.039** 0.008 -0.037** 0.011 -0.037** 0.008 -0.040** 0.005 
 
(-2.26) (0.31) (-2.15) (0.44) (-2.16) (0.31) (-2.33) (0.21) 
          0.104* 0.246*** 0.104* 0.249*** 0.104* 0.245*** 0.102* 0.242*** 
 
(1.92) (3.53) (1.94) (3.61) (1.93) (3.56) (1.90) (3.46) 
Star Fund (0/1) -0.873*** -1.046** -0.746*** -1.007** -0.847*** -1.050** -1.015*** -1.145** 
 
(-3.99) (-2.15) (-3.55) (-2.02) (-3.76) (-2.17) (-4.38) (-2.38) 
           0.259*** -0.112 0.277*** -0.090 0.273*** -0.112 0.257*** -0.126 
 
(3.03) (-0.41) (3.27) (-0.34) (3.26) (-0.41) (2.99) (-0.46) 
          -1.593*** 0.875 -1.568*** 0.819 -1.613*** 0.879 -1.574*** 0.889 
 
(-2.73) (0.78) (-2.73) (0.73) (-2.78) (0.79) (-2.71) (0.79) 
Lockup Period (months) -0.028** -0.011 -0.027** -0.011 -0.027** -0.012 -0.027** -0.012 
 
(-2.36) (-0.50) (-2.32) (-0.46) (-2.33) (-0.50) (-2.33) (-0.52) 
High Water Mark (0/1) -0.096 -0.378 -0.103 -0.377 -0.098 -0.379 -0.106 -0.384 
 
(-0.60) (-1.51) (-0.64) (-1.50) (-0.61) (-1.51) (-0.66) (-1.52) 
                           -0.014 -0.015 0.002 -0.018 -0.013 -0.015 -0.010 -0.014 
 
(-1.14) (-0.56) (0.15) (-0.57) (-1.04) (-0.57) (-0.88) (-0.51) 
         -0.371*** -0.665*** -0.385*** -0.676*** -0.377*** -0.665*** -0.364*** -0.654*** 
 
(-3.25) (-3.05) (-3.36) (-3.08) (-3.28) (-3.03) (-3.18) (-2.98) 
Offshore (0/1) 0.359** 0.623** 0.349** 0.605** 0.352** 0.624** 0.360** 0.633** 
 
(2.33) (2.34) (2.25) (2.28) (2.28) (2.33) (2.33) (2.37) 
# Top Service Providers 0.111 0.216 0.118* 0.213 0.111 0.215 0.110 0.217 
 (1.56) (1.57) (1.65) (1.55) (1.56) (1.56) (1.54) (1.58) 
         
Style & Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 270,291 270,291 270,291 270,291 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0823 0.0817 0.0813 0.0833 
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Panel B. Models without Star Fund 
 Outcome: Odd columns=partial stake, Even columns=full stake 
  Performance = Return Performance = Sharpe  Performance = Sty-adj. Return Performance = Alpha 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
        
                      0.214*** -0.005 0.155*** -0.065 0.149* 0.009 0.205*** 0.112 
 
(2.71) (-0.03) (2.78) (-0.56) (1.85) (0.05) (2.62) (0.67) 
                -0.037** -0.018 -0.039** -0.015 -0.035** -0.018 -0.036** -0.020 
 
(-2.24) (-0.63) (-2.35) (-0.53) (-2.11) (-0.64) (-2.22) (-0.71) 
          0.086* 0.224*** 0.084* 0.227*** 0.088* 0.224*** 0.086* 0.220*** 
 
(1.80) (2.74) (1.75) (2.78) (1.84) (2.73) (1.80) (2.68) 
           0.249*** -0.123 0.248*** -0.103 0.264*** -0.125 0.254*** -0.140 
 
(3.11) (-0.52) (3.08) (-0.43) (3.32) (-0.52) (3.18) (-0.58) 
          -1.364** 1.027 -1.313** 0.971 -1.395** 1.033 -1.361** 1.066 
 
(-2.47) (1.06) (-2.38) (1.00) (-2.53) (1.06) (-2.47) (1.10) 
Lockup Period (months) -0.026** 0.002 -0.027** 0.003 -0.026** 0.002 -0.026** 0.002 
 
(-2.32) (0.12) (-2.38) (0.16) (-2.29) (0.12) (-2.26) (0.10) 
High Water Mark (0/1) -0.090 -0.434* -0.094 -0.435* -0.091 -0.434* -0.094 -0.435* 
 
(-0.60) (-1.85) (-0.63) (-1.85) (-0.61) (-1.85) (-0.62) (-1.86) 
                           -0.023** -0.013 -0.007 -0.016 -0.021* -0.013 -0.021* -0.014 
 
(-1.99) (-0.54) (-0.61) (-0.67) (-1.81) (-0.55) (-1.81) (-0.60) 
         -0.309*** -0.605*** -0.309*** -0.613*** -0.316*** -0.604*** -0.307*** -0.597*** 
 
(-2.77) (-3.01) (-2.77) (-3.05) (-2.83) (-3.01) (-2.75) (-2.98) 
Offshore (0/1) 0.385*** 0.560** 0.391*** 0.548** 0.377*** 0.561** 0.377*** 0.567** 
 
(2.69) (2.05) (2.73) (2.00) (2.64) (2.05) (2.64) (2.07) 
# Top Service Providers 0.049 0.290** 0.055 0.285** 0.048 0.290** 0.048 0.293** 
 (0.69) (2.17) (0.78) (2.13) (0.69) (2.17) (0.68) (2.20) 
         
Style & Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 297,047 297,047 297,047 296,599 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0823 0.0817 0.0813 0.0833 
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Panel C. Models using squared performance measures 
 Outcome: Odd columns=partial stake, Even columns=full stake 
  Performance = Return Performance = Sharpe  Performance = Sty-adj. Return Performance = Alpha 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
        
                      1.124*** -0.345 0.504*** 0.215 0.808*** -0.521 0.695*** -0.208 
 
(5.40) (-1.02) (4.11) (0.88) (4.20) (-1.52) (3.81) (-0.63) 
              
  -0.392*** 0.155 -0.103*** -0.108 -0.390*** 0.294* -0.252*** 0.171 
 (-4.47) (1.21) (-3.07) (-1.23) (-3.53) (1.90) (-2.85) (1.17) 
                -0.043*** -0.015 -0.042** -0.018 -0.041** -0.014 -0.039** -0.018 
 
(-2.60) (-0.54) (-2.54) (-0.62) (-2.46) (-0.48) (-2.39) (-0.62) 
          0.087* 0.224*** 0.083* 0.222*** 0.084* 0.228*** 0.084* 0.222*** 
 
(1.79) (2.75) (1.73) (2.72) (1.75) (2.78) (1.75) (2.71) 
           0.258*** -0.121 0.246*** -0.098 0.260*** -0.108 0.257*** -0.138 
 
(3.20) (-0.51) (3.05) (-0.41) (3.24) (-0.45) (3.21) (-0.57) 
          -1.516*** 1.042 -1.407** 0.923 -1.395** 0.977 -1.409** 1.074 
 
(-2.70) (1.08) (-2.52) (0.94) (-2.53) (1.01) (-2.54) (1.11) 
Lockup Period (months) -0.027** 0.003 -0.027** 0.003 -0.027** 0.004 -0.026** 0.002 
 
(-2.39) (0.15) (-2.35) (0.16) (-2.40) (0.19) (-2.28) (0.12) 
High Water Mark (0/1) -0.099 -0.432* -0.096 -0.432* -0.094 -0.435* -0.099 -0.435* 
 
(-0.66) (-1.84) (-0.64) (-1.84) (-0.63) (-1.85) (-0.66) (-1.85) 
                           -0.006 -0.023 -0.009 -0.018 -0.017 -0.021 -0.011 -0.022 
 
(-0.54) (-0.89) (-0.81) (-0.74) (-1.50) (-0.85) (-0.98) (-0.88) 
         -0.317*** -0.605*** -0.312*** -0.613*** -0.321*** -0.603*** -0.314*** -0.594*** 
 
(-2.85) (-3.01) (-2.80) (-3.05) (-2.88) (-3.00) (-2.82) (-2.96) 
Offshore (0/1) 0.411*** 0.544** 0.397*** 0.556** 0.395*** 0.539** 0.391*** 0.553** 
 
(2.87) (1.99) (2.78) (2.02) (2.77) (1.97) (2.73) (2.02) 
# Top Service Providers 0.050 0.289** 0.048 0.283** 0.049 0.287** 0.047 0.295** 
 (0.71) (2.16) (0.68) (2.12) (0.70) (2.14) (0.66) (2.21) 
         
Style & Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 297,047 297,047 297,047 296,599 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0804 0.0780 0.0783 0.0775 
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Panel D. Models without Performance Measures 
 Outcome: Odd columns=partial stake, Even columns=full stake   
  (1) (2) 
  
 
 
                -0.031* -0.019 
 
(-1.91) (-0.68) 
          0.094** 0.228*** 
 
(1.97) (2.76) 
Star Fund (0/1) -0.773*** -1.169** 
 
(-3.61) (-2.26) 
           0.292*** -0.115 
 
(3.71) (-0.48) 
          -1.476*** 0.991 
 
(-2.68) (1.02) 
Lockup Period (months) -0.029** -0.001 
 
(-2.51) (-0.03) 
High Water Mark (0/1) -0.104 -0.443* 
 
(-0.70) (-1.89) 
                           -0.009 -0.006 
 
(-0.81) (-0.25) 
         -0.349*** -0.608*** 
 
(-3.13) (-3.04) 
Offshore (0/1) 0.413*** 0.609** 
 
(2.89) (2.23) 
# Top Service Providers 0.045 0.281** 
 (0.65) (2.12) 
  
 
Style & Year Dummies YES 
Observations 297,047 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0783 
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Table C2 
Fund-Level Logistic Models – Partial and Full Stakes Combined 
 
This table contains results of logistic regressions on the determinants of outside ownership. The dependent variable 
in each column is Sell, a dummy variable equal to 1 if a fund sells a stake to an outside owner at time t and 0 
otherwise. All independent variables are calculated based on the the two-year period prior to time t. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. All regressions include year and strategy dummies. Standard 
errors are clustered at the fund-level and adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Z-statistics are reported below the 
coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
 Perf. = Net Return Perf. = Sharpe Perf. = Sty. Adj. Perf. = Alpha 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
 
Lag Performance 0.295*** 0.232*** 0.146*** 0.383*** 
 
(4.72) (3.50) (2.97) (5.12) 
Lag Flow -0.035** -0.033** -0.035** -0.037*** 
 
(-2.54) (-2.39) (-2.50) (-2.64) 
Log(AUM) 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.116*** 
 
(2.76) (2.78) (2.77) (2.71) 
Star Fund (0/1) -1.012*** -0.977*** -0.906*** -1.160*** 
 
(-5.22) (-4.94) (-4.77) (-5.73) 
Delta 0.196** 0.212*** 0.205** 0.193** 
 
(2.43) (2.68) (2.54) (2.40) 
Vega -0.883* -0.910* -0.852* -0.862* 
 
(-1.84) (-1.90) (-1.78) (-1.80) 
Lockup -0.024** -0.024** -0.024** -0.024** 
 
(-2.47) (-2.44) (-2.46) (-2.44) 
High Water Mark (0/1/) -0.197 -0.198 -0.198 -0.206 
 
(-1.53) (-1.54) (-1.55) (-1.60) 
Return Volatility -0.016 -0.015 0.000 -0.011 
 
(-1.47) (-1.36) (0.04) (-1.07) 
Age -0.387*** -0.393*** -0.393*** -0.379*** 
 
(-4.23) (-4.27) (-4.29) (-4.13) 
Offshore (0/1) 0.487*** 0.478*** 0.481*** 0.487*** 
 
(3.74) (3.66) (3.68) (3.73) 
# Top Service Providers 0.097 0.096 0.101 0.096 
 (1.56) (1.54) (1.64) (1.54) 
     
Style Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 295,341 295,341 295,341 294,895 
Pseudo R2 0.0602 0.0592 0.0591 0.0615 
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Table C3 
Fund-Level Conditional Logistic Models 
 
This table contains results from yearly conditional logistic regressions modeling the determinants of outside 
ownership. The dependent variable in each column is Sell, which is equal to 1 if the hedge fund sells a stake to an 
outside owner at time t and 0 otherwise. All independent variables are calculated based on the the two-year period 
prior to time t. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. All regressions include year and 
strategy dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the fund-level and adjusted for heteroskedasticity and z-statistics 
are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A. Year Conditional Logistic Regressions 
 
Perf. = Net Return Perf. = Sharpe Perf. = Sty. Adj. Perf. = Alpha 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
    Lag Performance 0.295*** 0.146 0.232** 0.382*** 
 
(2.96) (1.56) (2.08) (3.54) 
Lag Flow -0.035** -0.035** -0.033** -0.037** 
 
(-2.11) (-2.06) (-2.00) (-2.18) 
Log(AUM) 0.117* 0.118* 0.118* 0.116* 
 
(1.88) (1.86) (1.88) (1.87) 
Star Fund (0/1) -1.012** -0.906** -0.977** -1.160*** 
 
(-2.41) (-2.31) (-2.34) (-2.81) 
Delta 0.196*** 0.205*** 0.212*** 0.193*** 
 
(3.73) (3.86) (3.80) (3.45) 
Vega -0.883 -0.852 -0.909 -0.862 
 
(-1.32) (-1.30) (-1.35) (-1.29) 
Lockup -0.024* -0.024* -0.024* -0.024* 
 
(-1.72) (-1.70) (-1.70) (-1.79) 
High Water Mark (0/1/) -0.197 -0.198 -0.198 -0.206 
 
(-0.69) (-0.70) (-0.70) (-0.72) 
Return Volatility -0.016 0.000 -0.015 -0.011 
 
(-0.72) (0.02) (-0.65) (-0.49) 
Age -0.387*** -0.393*** -0.393*** -0.379*** 
 
(-2.74) (-2.76) (-2.79) (-2.65) 
Offshore (0/1) 0.487*** 0.481*** 0.478*** 0.487*** 
 
(3.15) (3.14) (3.10) (3.11) 
# Top Service Providers 0.097 0.101 0.096 0.096 
 (1.33) (1.45) (1.32) (1.31) 
     
Style Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies NO NO NO NO 
Observations 297,047 297,047 297,047 296,599 
Pseudo R2 0.0321 0.0310 0.0309 0.0334 
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Table C4 
Fund-Level Linear Probability Models 
 
This table contains results of linear regressions modeling the determinants of outside ownership. The dependent 
variable in each column is Sell, a dummy variable equal to 1 if a fund sells a stake to an outside owner at time t and 
0 otherwise. All independent variables are calculated based on the the two-year period prior to time t. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. All regressions include year and strategy dummies. Standard 
errors are clustered at the fund-level and adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Z-statistics are reported below the 
coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
 
Perf. = Net Return Perf. = Sharpe Perf. = Sty. Adj. Perf. = Alpha 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
    Lag Performance 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(4.56) (3.69) (2.63) (5.23) 
Lag Flow -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-2.73) (-2.62) (-2.72) (-2.80) 
Log(AUM) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(2.81) (2.85) (2.84) (2.72) 
Star Fund (0/1) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(-6.57) (-6.21) (-6.07) (-7.14) 
Delta 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 
(2.07) (2.13) (2.04) (2.04) 
Vega -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 
 
(-1.87) (-1.88) (-1.80) (-1.80) 
Lockup -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** 
 
(-2.55) (-2.54) (-2.55) (-2.61) 
High Water Mark (0/1/) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-1.46) (-1.47) (-1.47) (-1.52) 
Return Volatility -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.66) (-0.69) (0.56) (-0.41) 
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(-4.36) (-4.40) (-4.41) (-4.26) 
Offshore (0/1) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(3.86) (3.78) (3.78) (3.88) 
# Top Service Providers 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.31) (1.28) (1.33) (1.27) 
     
Style FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 297,047 297,047 297,047 296,599 
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
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Table C5 
Company-Level Multinomial Logistic Models 
 
This table contains results of company-level multinomial logistic regressions used to predict the sale of either a partial stake or full stake to an outside owner. The 
base outcome is that the hedge fund firm does not sell a stake. The outcome variable equals one if the hedge fund sells a partial stake. The outcome variable 
equals two if the hedge fund sells a full stake to an outside owner. The outcome occurs at time t and all independent variables are from the two-year period prior 
to time t. The odd-numbered models predict the outcome of a partial stake sale. The even-numbered models predict the outcome of a full stake sale. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. All regressions include year and strategy dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the fund-level 
and adjusted for heteroskedasticity and z-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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 Outcome: Odd columns=partial stake, Even columns=full stake 
  Performance = Net Return Performance = Sharpe Ratio Performance = Style-adj. Return Performance = Alpha 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
        
                      0.307** 0.064 0.209** -0.088 0.169 0.147 0.362* 0.044 
 
(2.21) (0.23) (2.33) (-0.50) (1.13) (0.50) (1.88) (0.14) 
                -0.052* -0.003 -0.051* 0.005 -0.047* -0.005 -0.053* -0.002 
 
(-1.92) (-0.07) (-1.84) (0.11) (-1.75) (-0.11) (-1.92) (-0.05) 
          0.211** 0.252** 0.231*** 0.262** 0.202** 0.252** 0.213** 0.251** 
 
(2.39) (2.18) (2.66) (2.04) (2.32) (2.12) (2.41) (2.12) 
Star Fund (0/1) -0.150 -0.079 -0.257 -0.075 -0.028 -0.141 -0.294 -0.078 
 
(-0.37) (-0.11) (-0.70) (-0.11) (-0.07) (-0.21) (-0.64) (-0.11) 
           0.093*** -0.154 0.090*** -0.148 0.098*** -0.156 0.094*** -0.152 
 
(2.90) (-0.81) (2.79) (-0.78) (3.12) (-0.82) (2.94) (-0.80) 
          -0.529** 0.427 -0.525** 0.406 -0.528** 0.438 -0.526** 0.424 
 
(-2.10) (0.76) (-2.05) (0.71) (-2.13) (0.78) (-2.10) (0.76) 
Lockup Period (months) -0.748 -0.397 -0.753 -0.333 -0.710 -0.420 -0.745 -0.390 
 
(-1.16) (-0.32) (-1.17) (-0.27) (-1.10) (-0.34) (-1.15) (-0.32) 
High Water Mark (0/1) -0.438 -1.092** -0.456 -1.092** -0.416 -1.091** -0.457 -1.094** 
 
(-1.29) (-2.29) (-1.33) (-2.29) (-1.22) (-2.31) (-1.34) (-2.27) 
                           -0.060** -0.018   
-0.055** -0.019 -0.056** -0.016 
 
(-2.56) (-0.59) 
  
(-2.40) (-0.63) (-2.47) (-0.49) 
         -0.354* -0.810* -0.364* -0.815* -0.340* -0.807* -0.356* -0.810* 
 
(-1.77) (-1.89) (-1.82) (-1.90) (-1.70) (-1.89) (-1.78) (-1.90) 
Offshore (0/1) 0.581* 0.399 0.596* 0.398 0.580* 0.405 0.572* 0.397 
 
(1.89) (0.81) (1.95) (0.81) (1.87) (0.83) (1.86) (0.81) 
# Top Service Providers -0.006 0.109 -0.026 0.098 0.008 0.115 -0.009 0.109 
 (-0.04) (0.47) (-0.20) (0.43) (0.06) (0.51) (-0.07) (0.48) 
         
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 131,192 131,192 131,192 131,192 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0625 0.0615 0.0599 0.0627 
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Table C6 
Verification of Match Quality 
 
This table contains univariate comparisons of characteristics of the group of funds with outside 
owners to the control group of funds they are matched to via propensity score matching. The 
differences in the mean values of each group are compared using t-tests. 
 
  Control Treatment Control - Treatment 
Net Return (% p.m.) 0.77% 0.79% -0.02% 
Style-Adj. Return (% p.m.) 0.15% 0.17% -0.02% 
Sharpe Ratio (Annual) 1.10 1.03 0.07 
Alpha (% p.m.) 0.43% 0.48% -0.05% 
Average Flow (% p.m.) 0.82% 0.84% -0.02% 
Return Volatility (% p.m.) 2.61% 2.74% -0.13% 
Log(1 + AUM ($ millions)) 18.54 18.47 0.07 
Delta ($ millions) 0.44 0.5 -0.06 
Vega ($ millions) 0.03 0.05 -0.02* 
Lockup Period (Days) 100.29 92.22 8.07 
High Water Mark (0/1) 0.75 0.79 -0.04 
Offshore (0/1) 0.65 0.7 -0.05 
Log(1 + Age (in months)) 4.44 4.30 0.14*** 
Star Fund (0/1) 0.08 0.09 -0.01 
# Top Service Providers 1.22 1.34 -0.12 
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Table C7 
Performance Tests without Size Control 
This table contains the results when the tests in Tables 4 and 5 of the main paper are repeated omitting the 
lagged size variable. Panel A contains the results for the repeat of Table 4. Panels B-D contains the results for 
the repeat of Table 5.  
 
Panel A. Table 4 Tests without Lagged Size 
  Avg. Return Sharpe Ratio Style-Adj. Return Alpha 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Outside Owner (0/1) -0.046 -0.004 -0.045 -0.031 
 
(-0.78) (-0.05) (-0.81) (-0.48) 
Performance t-1 0.158*** 0.106** 0.178*** 0.152*** 
 
(3.12) (2.33) (3.69) (3.30) 
Flows -0.025*** 0.016 -0.015** 0.004 
 
(-2.70) (1.46) (-2.26) (0.41) 
Age -0.071 -0.086 -0.032 -0.034 
 
(-1.17) (-1.05) (-0.61) (-0.53) 
Management Fee 0.007 -0.245*** 0.081 0.031 
 
(0.10) (-2.65) (1.14) (0.55) 
Incentive Fee -0.004 0.007 0.004 -0.002 
 
(-0.64) (0.77) (0.73) (-0.29) 
Lockup Period 0.002 0.009 0.003 0.014** 
 
(0.30) (1.10) (0.70) (2.35) 
Offshore (0/1) -0.107 -0.043 -0.071 0.088 
 
(-1.60) (-0.44) (-1.14) (1.21) 
High Water Mark (0/1) 0.093 -0.089 0.078 0.061 
 
(1.17) (-0.79) (1.06) (0.70) 
     
Style FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 466 473 474 467 
R-squared 0.336 0.380 0.139 0.231 
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Panel B. Table 5, Panel A – Fund Age Subsamples w/o Lagged Size 
  Avg. Return Sharpe Ratio Style-Adj. Return Alpha 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Non-Top Quartile Age -0.015 -0.139 -0.030 0.000 
 
(-0.20) (-1.32) (-0.44) (0.01) 
Top Quartile Age -0.096 0.457** -0.138 -0.144 
 
(-0.67) (2.28) (-1.09) (-0.94) 
     
Difference (Below - Above) 0.081 -0.596*** 0.108 0.144 
p-value (diff.) 0.615 0.009 0.452 0.401 
 
 
Panel C. Table 5, Panel B – Outsider Experience Subsamples w/o Lagged Size 
  Avg. Return Sharpe Ratio Style-Adj. Return Alpha 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Non-Top Quartile Experience -0.068 -0.074 -0.103 -0.062 
 
(-0.66) (-0.51) (-1.10) (-0.57) 
Top Quartile Experience -0.015 0.065 -0.033 -0.028 
 
(-0.19) (0.59) (-0.47) (-0.33) 
     
Difference (Below - Above) -0.053 -0.139 -0.07 -0.034 
p-value (diff.) 0.679 0.447 0.552 0.804 
 
 
Panel D. Table 5, Panel C – Outsider Alternatives Experience Subsamples w/o Lagged Size 
  Avg. Return Sharpe Ratio Style-Adj. Return Alpha 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Alternatives Experience 0.090 0.146 0.146** 0.035 
 
(1.03) (1.26) (2.03) (0.40) 
No Alternatives Experience -0.113 -0.145 -0.224*** -0.030 
 
(-1.35) (-1.03) (-2.68) (-0.31) 
     
Difference (Below - Above) 0.203* 0.291 0.370*** 0.065 
p-value (diff.) 0.094 0.11 0.001 0.617 
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Table C8 
Performance Tests using Gross-of-Fee Returns 
 
This table repeats the tests in Table 4 using gross returns to calculate all performance variables. 
 
  Gross Return Gross Sharpe Ratio Style-Adj. Gross Return Gross Alpha 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Outside Owner (0/1) -0.000 -0.067 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(-0.23) (-0.60) (-0.44) (-1.46) 
Performance t-1 0.138** 0.233*** 0.130** 0.309*** 
 
(2.19) (4.33) (2.34) (4.99) 
Flows -0.000** -0.010 -0.000 0.000 
 
(-2.02) (-0.56) (-0.92) (0.28) 
Size -0.000 -0.039 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.36) (-1.06) (0.03) (0.05) 
Age -0.000 -0.022 -0.000 -0.002** 
 
(-0.55) (-0.20) (-0.01) (-2.04) 
Management Fee -0.001 -0.339*** 0.001 0.001 
 
(-0.68) (-2.96) (1.07) (0.87) 
Incentive Fee -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
(-0.35) (0.04) (1.21) (0.06) 
Lockup Period 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.46) (0.48) (0.64) (1.45) 
Offshore (0/1) -0.001 0.030 -0.001 0.001 
 
(-1.26) (0.24) (-0.99) (0.86) 
High Water Mark (0/1) 0.001 -0.191 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.92) (-1.40) (0.80) (0.26) 
     
Style FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 350 335 347 350 
R-squared 0.322 0.438 0.147 0.265 
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Table C9 
Expansion Effects –Probit & Tobit Models 
 
This table contains results of regressions examining the impact of outside ownership on firms’ ability to expand. The 
sample consists of fund companies with an outside owner and the propensity score matched sample of companies 
without an outside owner. The dependent variable in column 1 (2) is New Fund (New Strategy), an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if a firm opens a new fund (new strategies) in a given month. The dependent variable in column 3 (4) is # 
New Funds (# New Strategies), which is equal to the number of new funds (new strategies) the fund company opens 
in the 24-months after the outside owner purchases his stake. The regressions in columns 1 and 2 are probit models 
while columns 3 and 4 are tobit models in Panel A. Panel B contains conditional logistic regressions. The control 
variables are defined as in Table 4. All regressions contain strategy and year dummies. Standard errors are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the fund company level and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in 
parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A. Probit & Tobit 
 Probit Regressions Tobit Regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
New Fund New Strategy # New Funds # New Strategies 
  
    
Outside Owner (0/1) 0.588** 0.772* 1.410** 1.347*** 
 
(2.32) (1.90) (2.13) (7.78) 
                     -0.040 -0.254 -0.116 0.015 
 
(-0.20) (-1.08) (-0.20) (0.10) 
                0.048 0.042 0.129** 0.056*** 
 
(1.51) (1.06) (2.03) (5.90) 
          0.315*** 0.356*** 0.775*** 0.585*** 
 
(4.21) (3.20) (3.56) (53.92) 
         0.000 -0.004 -0.000 -0.014*** 
 
(0.39) (-0.84) (-0.20) (-9.07) 
Management Fee (%) 0.608* 0.384 0.950 1.344*** 
 
(1.65) (0.71) (1.06) (10.53) 
Incentive Fee (%) 0.000 0.131** -0.011 0.106*** 
 (0.01) (2.38) (-0.19) (9.52) 
Lockup Period (months) -0.014 0.020 -0.069 -0.021 
 
(-0.69) (0.44) (-1.10) (-1.40) 
Offshore (0/1) 0.776** -0.033 0.999 0.125 
 
(2.18) (-0.05) (1.16) (0.57) 
High Water Mark (0/1) -1.254* -0.398 0.294 1.126*** 
 (-1.86) (-0.63) (0.26) (5.06) 
     
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,634 3,997 184 184 
Pseudo R
2 0.128 0.105 0.0876 0.224 
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Panel B. Conditional Logit 
 Conditional Logit 
 
(1) (2) 
 
New Fund New Strategy 
  
  
Outside Owner (0/1) 0.576** 0.717 
 
(2.11) (1.14) 
                     0.118 0.416 
 
(0.43) (0.85) 
                0.050 0.090** 
 
(0.96) (2.00) 
          0.272 0.196 
 
(1.50) (0.73) 
         -0.000 0.000 
 
(-0.38) (0.04) 
Management Fee (%) 0.429 0.638 
 
(0.90) (1.01) 
Incentive Fee (%) -0.003 0.106* 
 (-0.09) (1.72) 
Lockup Period (months) -0.209 0.358 
 
(-0.32) (0.39) 
Offshore (0/1) 0.117 2.293 
 
(0.18) (1.55) 
High Water Mark (0/1) -0.040 0.065 
 (-1.26) (0.99) 
   
Year Dummies YES YES 
Observations 2,736 954 
Pseudo R
2 0.040 0.087 
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Table C10 
Base Flow Results using other Propensity Score Matched Samples 
 
This table contains the results in which the tests in Table 7 are repeated using the alternate propensity score 
matched samples in which funds are matched by Sharpe ratio, average style-adjusted return, and alpha, 
respectively. The dependent variable in each case is Flow, computed for the 24 months after the outside owner’s 
arrival. The independent variable of interest is Outside Owner, which is an indicator variable equal to 1 for funds 
with an outside owner and 0 otherwise. The independent variables fund size, age, and time-invariant fund 
characteristics (Management Fee, Incentive Fee, Lockup Period, and indicator variables for offshore domicile and 
the presence of a high water mark provision) as defined in Table 4. All regressions contain strategy and year fixed 
effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in 
parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
  Perf. = Sharpe Perf. = Style-Adj. Returns Perf. = Alpha 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
    
  
Outside Owner (0/1) 0.550** 0.518* 0.621** 0.599** 0.892*** 0.880*** 
 
(1.99) (1.88) (2.37) (2.27) (3.32) (3.26) 
                      0.611*** 0.613*** 0.824*** 0.798*** 0.265 0.212 
 
(4.30) (4.23) (3.82) (3.67) (1.44) (1.14) 
                      0.738*** 0.762*** 0.820*** 0.787*** 0.586*** 0.595*** 
 (5.15) (5.28) (3.64) (3.45) (3.05) (3.07) 
                0.070* 0.046 0.001 -0.008 0.063 0.023 
 
(1.83) (1.14) (0.02) (-0.22) (1.57) (0.54) 
          -0.541*** -0.515*** -0.219*** -0.177** -0.300*** -0.222** 
 
(-6.21) (-5.52) (-2.75) (-2.11) (-3.74) (-2.58) 
          -0.592**  -0.198  -0.724*** 
 
 (-2.12)  (-0.77)  (-2.66) 
Management Fee (%) 
 
0.114 
 
0.284  -0.111 
  
(0.39) 
 
(0.86)  (-0.49) 
Incentive Fee (%) 
 
-0.054* 
 
-0.010  -0.031 
  
(-1.75) 
 
(-0.36)  (-1.04) 
Lockup Period (months) 
 
-0.029 
 
0.014  -0.020 
  
(-1.17) 
 
(0.58)  (-0.87) 
Offshore (0/1) 
 
0.039 
 
-0.449  -0.469 
  
(0.12) 
 
(-1.49)  (-1.54) 
High Water Mark (0/1) 
 
-0.222 
 
-0.018  0.043 
  
(-0.62) 
 
(-0.05)  (0.12) 
     
  
Strategy FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 456 456 456 456 456 456 
R
2
 0.223 0.235 0.294 0.310 0.250 0.258 
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Table C11 
Impact of Outside Ownership on New Fund Flows 
 
This table contains results of multivariate regressions that examine the impact of outside ownership on the flows to 
funds opened after the outside owner purchases his stake. The dependent variable in each case is Flow, computed for 
the 24 months after the outside owner’s arrival. The independent variable of interest is Outside Owner, which is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 for funds with an outside owner and 0 otherwise. The independent variables fund size, 
age, and time-invariant fund characteristics (Management Fee, Incentive Fee, Lockup Period, and indicator variables 
for offshore domicile and the presence of a high water mark provision) as defined in Table 4. All regressions contain 
strategy and year fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported below the 
coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
  All New Funds Matched on Initial AUM 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Outside Owner (0/1) 1.902*** 1.548*** 1.640** 1.582** 
 
(4.07) (3.19) (2.55) (2.36) 
Size -1.636*** -1.801*** -1.659*** -1.866*** 
 
(-21.77) (-22.13) (-6.08) (-6.49) 
Management Fee 
 
0.698** 
 
1.898** 
  
(2.33) 
 
(2.11) 
Inc. Fee 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.181* 
  
(-0.08) 
 
(-1.84) 
Lockup 
 
0.012 
 
0.042 
  
(0.60) 
 
(0.77) 
Offshore 
 
1.713*** 
 
1.540* 
  
(5.71) 
 
(1.78) 
High Water Mark 
 
0.541 
 
0.768 
  
(1.22) 
 
(0.63) 
     Style FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,765 2,505 444 400 
R-squared 0.237 0.259 0.451 0.498 
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Table C12 
Impact of Outside Ownership on Fund Flows 
 
This table contains regressions in which the dependent variable is Flows. The regressions are estimated using 
monthly flows. The independent variables of interest for all regressions are interactions of Outside Owner, an 
indicator variable equal to 1 for funds with an outside owner and 0 otherwise, and variables indicating how far a 
given month is away from the date at which the outside owner purchased his stake. Months 1-6 is equal to 1 if the 
month is between 1 and 6 months after the stake sale and 0 otherwise; Months 7-12 is equal to 1 if the month is 
between 7 and 12 months after the stake sale and 0 otherwise; Months 13-24 is equal to 1 if the month is between 13 
and 24 months after the stake sale and 0 otherwise. All other controls are as defined previously in the paper. 
 
  Flow Flow 
      
OutsideOwner × Months 1-6 -0.032 0.036 
 
(-0.06) (0.07) 
OutsideOwner × Months 7-12 1.117 1.173 
 
(1.14) (1.18) 
OutsideOwner × Months 13-24 0.851** 0.874** 
 
(1.97) (1.97) 
Past 1-yr. Performance 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 
(7.37) (7.38) 
Past 2-yr. Performance 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.14) (0.06) 
Past Flows 0.137*** 0.130** 
 
(2.62) (2.53) 
Size -0.564*** -0.538*** 
 
(-3.60) (-3.10) 
Months 1-6 0.909** 0.918** 
 
(2.27) (2.20) 
Months 7-12 0.393 0.401 
 
(1.13) (1.13) 
   Other Controls NO YES 
Style FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Observations 12,527 12,527 
R-squared 0.018 0.019 
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Table C13 
Flow Impact on Various Subsamples 
 
This table contains results of multivariate regressions that examine how the flow impact of the outside owner varies 
with various fund characteristics and industry conditions. The sample consists of funds with an outside owner and 
the propensity score matched sample of funds without outside owners. The funds are then divided into subsamples 
based on whether they are above or below the sample median of a given characteristic. Panel A contains the 
regressions in which funds are divided based on whether their strategy is opaque or not. Non-opaque strategies are 
CTAs, Funds of Funds, and Long Only Equity. The remaining strategies are considered opaque. Panel B (C) 
compares the flow impact during good and bad (high and low) strategy performance (volatility) years. Panel D (E) 
compares the flow impact during good and bad (high and low) industry performance (volatility) years. Panel F 
compares the flow impact based on the number of layers the outside owner uses to take its ownership stake. The 
dependent variable in each case is Flows, computed for the 24-month period after the outside owner’s arrival. The 
independent variable of interest is Outside Owner, which is an indicator variable equal to 1 for funds with an outside 
owner and 0 otherwise. The control variables are defined as in Table 7 and are omitted for brevity. All regressions 
contain strategy and year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are 
reported below the coefficients in parentheses. The final row contains the difference in the reported coefficients. 
Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
Panel A. Opaque vs. Non-Opaque Strategies 
Treat × Opaque Strategies 0.746** 
 
(2.03) 
Treat × Non-Opaque Strategies 0.210 
 
(0.50) 
  
Diff. 0.536 
p-value  0.338 
 
Panel B. Below Median vs. Above Median Strategy Performance Years 
Treat × Below Median Strategy Performance 0.806* 
 
(1.80) 
Treat × Above Median Strategy Performance 0.398 
 
(1.00) 
  
Diff. 0.408 
p-value 0.488 
 
Panel C. Above Median vs. Below Median Strategy Volatility Years 
Treat × Above Median Strategy Volatility 0.716 
 
(1.36) 
Treat × Below Median Strategy Volatility 0.567 
 
(1.59) 
 
Diff. 0.149 
p-value 0.813 
82 
 
 
Panel D. Below Median vs. Above Hedge Fund Industry Performance Years 
Treat × Below Median Industry Performance 0.706* 
 
(1.65) 
Treat × Above Median Industry Performance 0.431 
 
(1.06) 
  
Diff. 0.408 
p-value 0.635 
 
 
Panel E. Above Median vs. Below Hedge Fund Industry Volatility Years 
Treat × Above Median Industry Volatility 0.419 
 
(0.75) 
Treat × Below Median Industry Volatility 0.584 
 
(1.71) 
 
Diff. -0.165 
p-value 0.800 
 
 
Panel F. Above Median vs. Below Median Number of Ownership Layers 
Treat × Above Median Number of Layers 0.729* 
 
(1.76) 
Treat × Below Median Number of Layers 0.752* 
 
(1.73) 
 
Diff. -0.023 
p-value 0.969 
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Table C14: Monitoring 
Outside Ownership and Return Management – Full Time Series 
This table contains results of multivariate regressions estimating the relation between outside ownership and return 
management. The dependent variable in each model is Return, which is equal to the fund’s monthly gross return, net 
return, or residual from the Fung & Hsieh (2004) 7-factor model. The variable of interest is December × Outside 
Owner × After, where December is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the return observation is from December and 0 
otherwise, Outside Owner is an indicator variable equal to 1 for funds with an outside owner and 0 otherwise, and 
After is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the year after the outside owner arrives and 0 otherwise. The control 
variables are the same as those in Table 3 of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2011). Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the fund level and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
All regressions contain strategy and year fixed effects. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Y = Gross Return Y = Net Return Y=Residual 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  
  
 
December 0.894*** 0.914*** 0.487*** 
 
(10.67) (10.49) (7.09) 
December × Outside Owner × After -0.361* -0.313 -0.300** 
 
(-1.90) (-1.51) (-2.09) 
December × After 0.117 0.101 0.171* 
 
(0.97) (0.77) (1.89) 
December × Outside Owner -0.364*** -0.398*** -0.321*** 
 
(-3.08) (-3.09) (-3.35) 
Outside Owner (0/1) -0.049 -0.036 -0.050* 
 
(-1.64) (-1.23) (-1.86) 
Non-December Quarter End (0/1) -0.141*** -0.143*** -0.026 
 
(-4.72) (-4.39) (-1.05) 
             -0.126 0.249 -0.536*** 
 
(-0.69) (1.12) (-3.70) 
         0.015 -0.013 -0.013 
 
(0.57) (-0.47) (-0.58) 
       0.006*** 0.005*** 0.014*** 
 
(3.89) (3.21) (12.21) 
                    0.033*** 0.029*** 0.020*** 
 
(7.42) (5.80) (5.26) 
     0.170*** 0.197*** 0.073*** 
 
(18.15) (16.09) (7.93) 
     0.050*** 0.054*** 0.020** 
 
(6.45) (6.33) (2.20) 
   
 
Other Controls YES YES YES 
Style FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 59,604 59,774 59,774 
R
2
 0.055 0.060 0.026 
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Table C15 
Subsample Analyses of Returns Management Effects 
This table contains results of multivariate regressions estimating the relation between outside ownership and returns 
management. The dependent variable in each model is Return, which is equal to the fund’s monthly gross return, net 
return, or residual from the Fung & Hsieh (2004) 7-factor model. The variable of interest is December × Outside 
Owner × After, where December is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the return observation is from December and 0 
otherwise, Outside Owner is an indicator variable equal to 1 for funds with an outside owner and 0 otherwise, and 
After is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the year after the outside owner arrives and 0 otherwise. The control 
variables are the same as those in Table 3 of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2011). Panel A contains the results when 
the sample is divided based on whether the ownership change occurs before or after 2003. Panel B contains the 
results when the sample is divided based on whether the fund company also has a change in board composition or 
compliance officer. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the fund level and t-statistics 
are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. All regressions contain strategy and year fixed effects. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
 
Panel A. Returns Management Before vs. After 2003 
  Gross Return Net Return Residual 
        
December (After 2003) 0.737*** 0.801*** 0.533*** 
 
(5.76) (6.57) (5.68) 
December (Before 2003) 0.837** 0.716* 0.440 
 
(2.05) (1.88) (1.39) 
December x Outside Owner x After (After 2003)  -0.592** -0.576** -0.379* 
 
(-2.11) (-2.15) (-1.90) 
December x Outside Owner x After (Before 2003) -0.030 0.009 0.100 
 
(-0.05) (0.02) (0.21) 
December x Outside Owner (After 2003) 0.162 0.150 -0.034 
 
(0.88) (0.86) (-0.26) 
December x Outside Owner (Before 2003) -0.043 -0.050 0.106 
 
(-0.08) (-0.10) (0.27) 
    December (After – Before 2003) -0.100 0.085 0.093 
December × Outside Owner × After (After – Before 2003) -0.562 -0.585 -0.479 
December × Outside Owner (After – Before 2003) 0.205 0.200 -0.140 
    Other Controls YES YES YES 
Strategy FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
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Panel B. Changes in Governance Structure  
(115 out of 280 funds experience change, 71 do not, 94 are missing) 
  Gross Return Net Return Residual 
        
December (Governance Change) 0.996*** 0.904*** 0.714*** 
 
(5.71) (5.50) (6.02) 
December (No Governance Change) 0.379 0.339 0.316* 
 
(1.64) (1.57) (1.66) 
December x Outside Owner x After (Governance Change)  -0.862** -0.805** -0.418 
 
(-2.59) (-2.54) (-1.47) 
December x Outside Owner x After (No Governance Change) 0.068 0.033 -0.174 
 
(0.13) (0.07) (-0.56) 
December x Outside Owner (Governance Change) 0.269 0.260 0.090 
 
(1.17) (1.22) (0.53) 
December x Outside Owner (No Governance Change) -0.219 -0.172 -0.130 
 
(-0.69) (-0.60) (-0.56) 
    December (Governance – No Governance) 0.617** 0.565** 0.398* 
December × Outside Owner × After (Governance – No Governance) -0.930 -0.838 -0.244 
December × Outside Owner (Governance – No Governance) 0.488 0.432 0.220 
    Other Controls YES YES YES 
Strategy FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
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Table C16: Monitoring 
Outside Ownership and Risk-Shifting 
 
This table contains results of multivariate regressions estimating the relation between outside ownership and risk-
shifting. The sample consists of funds with an outside owner and the propensity score matched sample of funds. The 
dependent variable in each model is Risk Shift, which is equal to the difference in the standard deviations of returns 
from the second half and the first half of a given year. The variable of interest is Performance × Outside Owner × 
After, where Performance is measured relative to the fund’s own high water mark or other funds in a given year, 
following Aragon and Nanda (2012). Outside Owner is an indicator variable equal to 1 for funds with an outside 
owner and 0 otherwise, and After is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the year after the outside owner arrives and 0 
otherwise. Panel A contains the results for the full sample of funds. Panel B contains the results when the sample is 
divided based on whether the ownership change occurs before or after 2008. Panel C contains the results when the 
sample is divided based on outsider reputation. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at 
the fund level and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. All regressions contain strategy and 
year fixed effects. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Full Sample 
  Performance = Absolute Performance = Relative 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
    
Performance -0.394** -0.361** -0.591* -0.586* 
 
(-2.39) (-2.20) (-1.73) (-1.71) 
Performance × Outside Owner × After 0.589** 0.595** 1.074*** 1.069*** 
 
(2.32) (2.33) (2.88) (2.85) 
Performance × After 0.407*** 0.400** 0.745*** 0.748*** 
 
(2.61) (2.57) (3.02) (3.03) 
Performance × Outside Owner -0.307 -0.296 -0.202 -0.201 
 (-1.36) (-1.32) (-0.44) (-0.44) 
Outside Owner (0/1) 0.061 0.078 -0.070 -0.043 
 
(0.38) (0.49) (-0.27) (-0.17) 
Flow -0.354*** -0.342*** -0.372*** -0.344*** 
 
(-3.41) (-3.30) (-3.75) (-3.47) 
∆ρ -0.124 -0.142 -0.204** -0.216** 
 
(-1.28) (-1.42) (-2.13) (-2.20) 
Lag Standard Deviation -0.495*** -0.499*** -0.455*** -0.462*** 
 
(-13.75) (-13.92) (-13.31) (-13.61) 
     
Other Control Variables NO YES NO YES 
Style FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
     
Observations 885 885 885 885 
R
2
 0.295 0.300 0.318 0.324 
 
 
  
 
